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Restructuring Copyright Infringement 
Abraham Bell* and Gideon Parchomovsky** 
Copyright law employs a one-size-fits-all strict liability regime against all 
unauthorized users of copyrighted works. The current regime takes no account 
of the blameworthiness of the unauthorized user or of the information costs she 
faces. Nor does it consider ways in which the rightsholders may have contributed 
to potential infringements, or ways in which they could have cheaply avoided 
them. A nonconsensual use of a copyrighted work entitles copyright owners to 
the full panoply of remedies available under the Copyright Act, including supra-
compensatory damage awards, disgorgement of profits, and injunctive relief. 
This liability regime is unjust, as it largely fails to differentiate among willful 
infringers, good-faith users who accidently infringe, and ordinary users who fail 
to understand the intricacies of copyright-protection infringement. No less 
importantly, one-size-fits-all liability sets back the goals of the copyright system 
by excessively deterring newly created works and encouraging copyright owners 
to be less than forthcoming about their expectations from users. 
In this Article, we propose a radically different liability regime predicated 
on the degree of the infringer’s blameworthiness. Concretely, we call for the 
establishment of three distinct liability categories—inadvertent, standard, and 
willful infringements—and tailor a specific menu of remedies for each of the 
categories. Under our proposal, inadvertent infringements would be remedied 
by compensatory damages only. Standard infringements would entitle copyright 
owners to a broader variety of monetary damages, including disgorgement of 
profits and limited statutory damages, but typically no injunctive relief. Willful 
infringements would be addressed by the full variety of remedies available under 
the Copyright Act, including punitive statutory damages and injunctions. 
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We demonstrate that our proposed system of graduated liability yields a far 
more nuanced and just liability system, one that would also enhance use of 
existing works and promote future creativity. Limiting the potential liability of 
users and creators would facilitate the use of copyrighted content and the 
production of future works. It would also result in a fairer copyright system, the 
benefits of which would inure to society at large. At the same time, by organizing 
infringement into our proposed categories, our system would reform 
infringement law without imposing excessive new fact-finding burdens on courts 
and litigants. 
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Introduction 
Earlier in 2018, the music world found itself engulfed in yet another 
copyright controversy, when Universal Music Studios—which owns the 
copyright in The White Stripes’ “Seven Nation Army”—sent a presuit letter 
to the creators of the song that won the 2018 Eurovision song contest. 
According to Universal Music Studios, the winning Eurovision song, “Toy,” 
performed by the singer Netta, was impermissibly substantially similar to 
“Seven Nation Army.” Despite the obvious differences in lyrics and melody 
between the two songs, Universal’s attorneys claimed that they share the 
same rhythm and harmony.1 
Such controversies are all too common in the copyright world. In 
Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc.,2 Robin Thicke acknowledged that 
Marvin Gaye’s music was an inspiration for the Thicke and Pharrell Williams 
collaboration “Blurred Lines.”3 However, while “Blurred Lines” shared some 
of the “feel” of Gaye’s “Got to Give It Up,” it copied none of the melody or 
lyrics.4 The actual sound recording of “Got to Give It Up,” meanwhile, was 
unprotected due to a copyright technicality,5 meaning that Thicke and 
Pharrell could copy Gaye’s recording (but not composition) with impunity. 
Nevertheless, a jury decided that the appropriation of the mood and feel of 
Gaye’s song was enough to ground a decision of infringement.6 From there, 
it was a short distance to the order of $5.6 million in damages (an amount 
that was subsequently reduced to about $3.5 million) to the estate of Marvin 
Gaye, as well as 50% of future proceeds from the song.7 The appeals and 
rehearings eventually upheld the result.8 
These and all too many other cases highlight a central flaw in the extant 
copyright system of enforcement. Under copyright law’s standard of uniform 
liability, a defendant who subconsciously or inadvertently borrows protected 
 
1. Michael Bachner, Israel’s Eurovision Win in Jeopardy as US Label Claims Netta’s ‘Toy’ 
Was Copied, TIMES ISRAEL (July 3, 2018, 10:50 PM), https://www.timesofisrael.com/israels-
eurovision-win-in-jeopardy-as-us-label-claims-nettas-toy-was-copied/ [https://perma.cc/X6ND-
MN92]; Amy Spiro, Does ‘Toy’ Sound Like ‘Seven Nation Army’?, JERUSALEM POST (July 3, 
2018), https://www.jpost.com/OMG/Does-Toy-sound-like-Seven-Nation-Army-561473 [https://
perma.cc/84KJ-J4M8]. 
2. No. LA CV13–06004 JAK (AGRx), 2015 WL 4479500 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2015), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part sub nom. Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2018). 
3. Id. at *12. 
4. Id. at *21. 
5. Id. at *5 (limiting protection to musical elements contained in the lead sheets of “Got to Give 
It Up,” which was registered while the 1909 Copyright Act was in effect). 
6. Id. at *1. 
7. The $5.6 million award of damages was remitted to approximately $3.5 million on remittitur. 
Id. at *30. The running royalty of 50% of future proceedings was sustained. Id. at *45. 
8. Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106, 1128 (9th Cir. 2018). It should be noted that, in part, the 
lower-court judgment was affirmed because certain issues had not been properly raised for appeal. 
Id. at 1130–31. 
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elements of a copyrighted work is just as liable as one who willfully pirates 
and distributes an entire work. A trivial infringement—such as a too-long 
quotation from a book9 or the unconscious borrowing of elements of a pop 
tune10—is treated just like a willful and malicious pirating and distributing of 
a copyrighted work.11 Infringers are liable for damages that bear no 
proportion to the moral culpability of the defendant or, for that matter, to the 
damages that their behavior actually causes. The compensation amount in 
copyright-infringement cases depends only on amounts specified by statute, 
the harm inflicted on the plaintiff, or the profit of the defendant.12 Blatant 
infringers who profit little may end up paying modest damages, while 
inadvertent infringers who create popular works may end up paying 
enormous damages.13 The degree of liability is completely divorced from the 
degree of culpability of the defendant. It is likewise divorced from the actual 
harm to society caused by the infringement. 
Compare, for instance, the cases of Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. 
Penguin Books USA, Inc.14 and Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.15 
Campbell concerned a claim of infringement against 2 Live Crew. The band’s 
song “Pretty Woman” had copied a bass riff and several lyrics from Roy 
Orbison’s “Oh, Pretty Woman.”16 The Supreme Court ruled that the copying 
was within the bounds of fair use and thus not actionable.17 A short time later, 
Alan Katz and Chris Wrinn wrote an account of the O.J. Simpson trial in the 
style of a Dr. Seuss book, entitled The Cat NOT in the Hat! A Parody by 
Dr. Juice.18 Katz and Wrinn clearly thought their copying of the Dr. Seuss 
style was permissible fair use, as in Campbell.19 The courts disagreed. Once 
they determined that The Cat NOT in the Hat! used materials in a style not 
favored by the fair use doctrine, the courts fell back upon the ordinary 
 
9. See, e.g., Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 527, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008) (holding that the copying of long quotations from a novel is copyright infringement). 
10. See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc., 2015 WL 4479500, at *1 (discussing the potential copying 
of Marvin Gaye’s “Got to Give It Up” by the defendants in “Blurred Lines”); Bright Tunes Music 
Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177, 180–81 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (holding that George 
Harrison’s song “My Sweet Lord” infringed on an earlier song, even though Harrison’s copying 
was subconscious), aff’d sub nom. ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988 
(2d Cir. 1983); ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 508 F. Supp. 798, 799 (S.D.N.Y. 
1981) (ruling on the alleged infringement by George Harrison’s song “My Sweet Lord”), modified, 
722 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1983);. 
11. See infra Part II. 
12. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2012). 
13. See id. (prescribing statutory-damage amounts). 
14. 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997). 
15. 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
16. Id. at 572, 588. 
17. Id. at 572. 
18. Dr. Seuss Enters., 109 F.3d at 1396. 
19. See id. at 1397 (quoting Katz’s declaration that The Cat in the Hat was the “object for [his] 
parody”). 
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doctrines of copyright infringement.20 The trial court therefore enjoined 
further distribution of the book.21 It is extremely difficult to locate copies of 
the Katz–Wrinn work today. 
In this Article, we propose a radical reform in the way copyright law 
assigns liability. Extant copyright law treats virtually all copyright 
infringements similarly for purposes of liability.22 As a general rule, 
copyright law does not distinguish among different types of infringement. 
Nor is it open, in its current design, to the idea that liability should be graded 
based on the degree of wrongdoing by the infringer.23 Consequently, all 
infringers are exposed to the full cascade of monetary remedies and 
injunctive relief.24 Liability is currently an objective inquiry in which courts 
decide whether the alleged defendant copied protected expressive elements 
from the plaintiff.25 Once the basic elements of an infringement suit—
copying and improper appropriation26—have been established, liability 
attaches to the defendant, and the plaintiff is entitled to a menu of potential 
remedies: statutory damages, recovery of her losses or the defendant’s 
profits, and, in addition, seizure of infringing copies and even injunctions 
barring the defendant from using or distributing her own work.27 
Infringement remedies under current law can be quite harsh, even where 
the infringement is questionable. The celebrated cases of Bright Tunes Music 
Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd.28 (regarding alleged infringement by the 
 
20. Id. at 1400 (limiting the parody defense only to cases involving a discernable direct 
comment on the original). 
21. Id. at 1406 (enjoining the defendants from “directly or indirectly” copying and distributing 
the book). 
22. See infra Part II. 
23. The one exception is statutory damages. See Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, 
Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 
441 (2009) (explaining upper-end damage awards are “reserved for ‘willful’ infringers”). 
24. See infra Part II. 
25. See, e.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) (setting out the modern test 
for determining whether a defendant copied the protected elements of a work); Nichols v. Universal 
Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (discussing how a court should go about deciding 
whether a movie has copied a previously written play). 
26. The terminology for these two elements differs among courts and legal scholars, but the 
basic elements are the same. See Laureyssens v. Idea Grp., Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 140 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(discussing the presence of the substantial similarity requirement in both the copying and the 
improper-appropriation prong); Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468 (setting out a two-prong test for copyright 
infringement with the first prong being copying and the second being improper appropriation); Alan 
Latman, “Probative Similarity” as Proof of Copying: Toward Dispelling Some Myths in Copyright 
Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1187, 1198 (1990) (discussing both the vagueness of the term 
improper appropriation and the confusion caused by having substantial similarity as a part of both 
prongs). 
27. 17 U.S.C. §§ 502–504 (2012). 
28. 420 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff’d sub nom. ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, 
Ltd., 722 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1983). 
PARCHOMOVSKY.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/23/2020  1:37 PM 
684 Texas Law Review [Vol. 98:679 
 
George Harrison song “My Sweet Lord”)29 and Williams v. Bridgeport 
Music, Inc. (regarding alleged infringement by the Thicke–T.I.–Pharrell song 
“Blurred Lines”)30 provide a powerful illustration. In Harrisongs, George 
Harrison was found to have subconsciously infringed the copyright in The 
Chiffons’ song “He’s So Fine” by writing and releasing to the public his own 
hit song “My Sweet Lord.”31 The court believed Harrison’s testimony about 
the creative process that yielded “My Sweet Lord,” including the key fact 
that Harrison composed his song without consciously copying anything from 
The Chiffons’ earlier song.32 But little did it help Harrison. The court ordered 
the payment of $1.6 million of Harrison’s earnings from “My Sweet Lord” 
to the music publisher of The Chiffons.33 
As these and many other cases illustrate, copyright law is deliberately 
draconian. The lines separating infringing “copying” from noninfringing 
inspiration can be difficult to discern. As well, the boundaries of permitted 
behavior—under the doctrine of fair use, or as a result of owner-granted or 
statutory licenses—can be fuzzy.34 But court decisions are dichotomous. 
Once the line is crossed and an infringement is established, the rules of relief 
are uniform and harsh. 
There is one outstanding exception to the rule of uniform damages: 
statutory damages. The statutory provision that provides for statutory 
damages embodies a three-part design.35 Section 504(c) differentiates among 
standard infringements, willful infringements, and innocent infringements.36 
It then gives courts discretion to award damages ranging from $750 to 
$30,000 per infringement in cases of standard infringements, while 
empowering them to step up the amount to $150,000 in cases of willful 
infringements and reduce it to merely $200 in cases of innocent 
infringements.37 We posit that the statutory-damages framework constitutes 
a useful blueprint for reforming infringement analysis in all cases. Yet, we 
also argue that the other forms of available relief, as well as the structure of 
statutory damages, should be altered to create a harmonious legal regime. 
 
29. Id. at 178. 
30. Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. LA CV13–06004 JAK (AGRx), 2015 WL 4479500, 
at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 
1106 (9th Cir. 2018). 
31. Bright Tunes, 420 F. Supp. at 180. 
32. Id. 
33. ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 508 F. Supp. 798, 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), 
modified, 722 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1983). 
34. See infra section I(B)(4). 
35. See Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 23, at 474 (discussing the “tripartite structure” of 
statutory-damages awards under the Copyright Act of 1976). 
36. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2012). 
37. Id. 
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Our proposed reform, thus, consists of two changes. First, drawing 
inspiration from the extant rules of statutory damages, we argue that 
infringements should be divided into three different categories, with varying 
legal consequences. The first category would be called “inadvertent 
infringement” and would encompass two prototypical infringement cases: 
(a) subconscious infringements, as in the case of Bright Tunes Music v. 
Harrisongs Music;38 and (b) infringements involving nothing more than 
appropriation of “concept and feel,” à la Williams v. Bridgeport Music39 or 
other cases where the infringement is so small or questionable that a court 
could conclude that the infringer reasonably believed in good faith that 
nothing protectable was copied. 
At the other end of culpability, the third category would be labelled 
“willful infringements.” This category would include blatant and inexcusable 
infringement, such as wholesale, repeated copying of works in their entirety, 
without plausible claims of license or statutory excuse. The actions of 
copyright pirates would ordinarily fall within this category. 
Finally, a middle, second category would include all other infringements 
and be labelled “standard infringements.” This category would encompass 
cases where the defendant is not blameless but is clearly not as culpable as 
the willful infringer. This would include cases such as colorable cases of fair 
use in which the defendant mistakenly “went too far,” as happened in 
Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc.40 and cases in which 
the infringers accidently exceeded the terms of their licenses. This last type 
of case is best illustrated by the litigation surrounding claims that the group 
The Verve infringed upon the copyright in the Rolling Stones’ song “The 
Last Time” when The Verve sampled too-large a portion of the Andrew 
Oldham Orchestra’s symphonic recording of the Rolling Stones’ song.41 
According to former Rolling Stones manager Allen Klein, who owned the 
copyright in the Rolling Stones composition, The Verve had negotiated a 
license to sample five notes from the Andrew Oldham Orchestra recording, 
but the portion it actually used slightly exceeded the five-note limit.42 Rather 
 
38. Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 
1976), aff’d sub nom. ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1983). 
39. Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., LA CV13–06004 JAK (AGRx), 2015 WL 4479500, at 
*21 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106 
(9th Cir. 2018). 
40. See Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1402–03 (9th Cir. 
1997) (stating that a fair use defense was unconvincing because of the substantial similarity between 
the infringing work and original work). 
41. Jordan Runtagh, Songs on Trial: 12 Landmark Music Copyright Cases, ROLLING STONE 
(June 8, 2016, 4:24 PM), http://www.rollingstone.com/music/lists/songs-on-trial-12-landmark-
music-copyright-cases-20160608/the-verve-vs-the-rolling-stones-1997-20160608 [https://
perma.cc/ZEC4-3JGY]. 
42. Id. 
PARCHOMOVSKY.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/23/2020  1:37 PM 
686 Texas Law Review [Vol. 98:679 
 
than face costly and uncertain litigation, The Verve settled out of court and 
yielded all the revenues from “Bitter Sweet Symphony,” the group’s biggest 
hit.43  
The second prong of our reform is to tailor the remedies for each of our 
proposed three categories to the degree of infringer culpability. Under our 
proposal, for cases of inadvertent infringements, courts would be limited to 
awarding purely compensatory damages and, in very rare cases, also 
injunctive relief to stop unauthorized distribution of unauthorized copies. For 
cases of standard infringements, courts would be able to expand the remedial 
menu and, in addition to compensatory damages, order disgorgement of 
profits or, in the alternative, limited statutory damages. Here, too, injunctive 
relief would typically be withheld. Finally, in cases of willful infringement, 
courts would be able to utilize the full panoply of copyright remedies, 
including all of the above, as well as high statutory damages, criminal 
sanctions, and injunctive relief. Importantly, the new liability regime would 
limit courts both in lawsuits for standard remedies and for statutory damages, 
thus bringing uniformity to copyright remedies while differentiating liability 
according to culpability. 
Proper allocation of the burdens of proof would be necessary for our 
reform to be workable. In our scheme, all infringements would be 
presumptively standard, unless either the defendant could prove her 
innocence or the plaintiff could prove willfulness or malice. In other words, 
the burden of proving that a case should be classified as an inadvertent 
infringement case would rest with the user–infringer, while the burden of 
proof that an infringement was willful would lie with the plaintiff copyright 
owner. Yet, we would supplement the aforementioned rules concerning the 
burden of proof with one additional possibility: we would allow users to 
initiate suits seeking declaratory judgments that they were entitled to the 
status of an innocent infringer. 
Calibrating liability (and remedies) to culpability holds obvious 
intuitive moral appeal. But it is also advantageous from a utilitarian 
perspective. Copyright protection imposes substantial information costs on 
third parties, among them, other authors. The high level of risk of legal 
liability when creating new works is the result of many factors in 
combination: the vast universe of protected works, the difficulty of 
distinguishing between elements that are copyrighted (that cannot be used 
without permission) and uncopyrighted (that can be freely used), the broad 
scope of liability that makes even unconscious copying actionable, and the 
existence of malleable defenses to liability. The problem is exacerbated by 
the absence of a readily available registry of all existing works. This makes 
it nearly impossible to know not only what works and which aspects of them 
 
43. Id. 
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are protected but also who the relevant rightsholders are. In this 
informationally treacherous environment, the best way to curb the risks faced 
by aspiring authors is to limit the liability to which they will be exposed if 
they unknowingly commit a copyright infringement. This not only reduces 
unnecessary barriers to entry by new authors, it also incentivizes authors to 
make their claims known as widely as possible, so as to foreclose the 
possibility of innocent infringements. 
Efficiency supports bringing copyright punishments closer to existing 
moral intuitions for another reason as well. Extant literature points to a 
significant gap between popular understandings of social norms of copyright 
and the law of copyright, as well as between the demands of the law and 
popular understanding of those demands.44 These gaps increase the costs of 
enforcing copyright. Potential defendants will not conform their behavior to 
a law of which they are unaware, and given both the difficulty of detecting 
infringement and the difficulty of understanding the law, it may be rational 
to remain ignorant. At the same time, these gaps may lead judges and courts 
to depart unilaterally from the legal norms when they believe the law is 
unnecessarily harsh. By reducing these gaps, lawmakers can help copyright 
enforcement become cheaper and more uniform. Even if penalties are 
reduced in some cases, improvements in the rate and accuracy of enforcement 
can lead to a better incentive structure of the law.45 
Concerns for efficiency also lay behind the scope of our potential 
reform. Given the wide variety of potential types of infringements, one might 
imagine an infinite range of remedies, each tailored to the precise degree of 
culpability. However, administering such infinitely tailored remedies would 
prove enormously costly for two reasons: learning and administering a new 
(and unbounded) legal system would place a heavy burden on courts and 
litigants, as would gathering and exposing evidence relevant to the infinitely 
tailored system.46 By building on the existing categories of statutory 
damages, and by limiting the potential classes of liability to three, we 
minimize the potential administrative and litigation costs associated with our 
proposed overhaul of the law of liability. In particular, given the fact that 
most copyright-infringement cases already involve claims for statutory 
 
44. See Ben Depoorter et al., Copyright Backlash, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1251, 1253–54 (2011) 
(pointing out the gap between copyright law and the social norms pertaining to use of copyrighted 
content); Ben Depoorter & Sven Vanneste, Norms and Enforcement: The Case Against Copyright 
Litigation, 84 OR. L. REV. 1127, 1128 (2005) (same); Ben Depoorter et al., Problems with the 
Enforcement of Copyright Law: Is There a Social Norm Backlash?, 12 INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 361, 
362 (2005) (same); John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright Reform and the Law/Norm 
Gap, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 537, 543 (same). 
45. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 
170 (1968) (discussing the varying resource costs of different methods of law enforcement). 
46. See infra Part IV. 
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damages,47 our proposal will not add substantially to the existing evidentiary 
burden. 
We lay out our argument in three parts. In Part I, we review the extant 
law of infringements, demonstrating the vast array of circumstances and 
harms encompassed by the term “copyright infringement.” In Part II, we 
examine the remedies available under copyright law, while emphasizing, in 
particular, their Procrustean nature. Additionally, we demonstrate why the 
narrow range of available remedies is socially undesirable. In Part III, we 
offer our proposed reform of copyright remedies. Finally, in Part IV, we 
explain why, despite the advantage of staggered remedies, we offer only three 
categories based on culpability. 
I. The Wide World of Infringements 
In this Part, we highlight just some of the many ways in which copyright 
law might be infringed. The categories of infringement we offer here are not 
those of the law. In fact, the law conceives of all infringements as identical. 
As we will show in the next Part, no matter what kind of infringement, 
copyright law offers the same remedy. 
We begin with some general observations about infringements, before 
offering a tentative classification of different kinds of infringements based on 
culpability. As we show in the conclusion of this Part, mistakes are the source 
of many—and probably most—infringements. 
A. The Vagueness of Infringement Law 
As a preliminary matter, it is important to observe that the variability of 
infringements is deeply rooted in copyright law. Copyright law is, of 
necessity, vague and often maddeningly so. Copyright law grants authors48 
monopoly rights in their expressions, but defining the nature or even the 
protected expressions of that monopoly is no easy matter. Perhaps the most 
famous expression of this vagueness is Justice Story’s observation that 
“copyrights approach, nearer than any other class of cases . . . to what may 
be called the metaphysics of the law, where the distinctions are, or at least 
may be, very subtle and refined, and, sometimes, almost evanescent.”49 No 
 
47. See Ben Depoorter, Copyright Enforcement in the Digital Age: When the Remedy Is the 
Wrong, 66 UCLA L. REV. 400, 402–04 (2019) (discussing the “astronomically high” statutory-
damages awards copyright-infringement plaintiffs can expect). 
48. Sometimes the law grants the rights to persons other than the author. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 
(2012) (defining “a work made for hire” as “a work prepared by an employee within the scope of 
his or her employment,” or as a commissioned work); Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 
490 U.S. 730, 732, 737 (1989) (explaining the work-made-for-hire doctrine and how this could 
translate into the author not becoming the owner of the work he has produced). 
49. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901). 
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less famous is Judge Learned Hand’s explanation of copyright law’s idea–
expression dichotomy: 
The test for infringement of a copyright is of necessity vague. In the 
case of verbal “works” it is well settled that although the 
“proprietor’s” monopoly extends beyond an exact reproduction of the 
words, there can be no copyright in the “ideas” disclosed but only in 
their “expression.” Obviously, no principle can be stated as to when 
an imitator has gone beyond copying the “idea,” and has borrowed its 
“expression.” Decisions must therefore inevitably be ad hoc.50 
Copyright law protects all original works of authorship fixed in a 
tangible medium of expression for more than a fleeting moment.51 Works do 
not need to be published to be protected.52 While there is a copyright registry, 
works need not be marked or registered to qualify for protection.53 It is 
difficult to know what qualifies as a work of authorship; in recent decades, 
 
50. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960). 
51. 17 U.S.C. § 101, 102(a). The 1976 Act does not preempt common law copyright protection 
of unfixed works, such as lectures or prepared dialogues. Id. § 301(b)(1). But cf. Estate of 
Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 268 N.Y.S.2d 531, 536–37 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (considering but 
rejecting common law protection for conversations Hemingway had with the author of the 
biography in question), aff’d, 25 A.D.2d 719 (N.Y. App. Div. 1966). 
52. 1 HOWARD B. ABRAMS, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 8:25 (2010); see, e.g., Thomas F. 
Cotter, Toward a Functional Definition of Publication in Copyright Law, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1724, 
1725–28 (2008) (reasoning that while publication is no longer required to establish copyright, there 
are still important reasons why publication might still matter). 
53. 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (registration not required); ABRAMS, supra note 52, at § 9:4 (notice not 
required); id. at § 10:2 (registration not required). Prior to March 1, 1989, the 1976 Act required 
proper notice on published works, failure of which could result in forfeiture of protection. ABRAMS, 
supra note 52, at § 9:65; see also Cotter, supra note 52, at 1725 (discussing how the Berne 
Convention removed the notice requirement from U.S. copyright law); Thomas M. Landrigan, 
Application or Registration?: Confusion Regarding the Copyright Act’s Prerequisite to Copyright 
Infringement Lawsuits, 44 IND. L. REV. 581, 583 (2011) (stating that while registration is not 
required, it is required before instituting a suit for copyright infringement). 
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protection has been claimed for works as diverse as computer operating 
systems,54 tattoos,55 and a wildflower garden.56 
The uncertain legal standards combine with the law’s formalities to 
create yet more doubt. For instance, while copyright protection is extremely 
long-lasting (generally lasting for more than a century),57 the terms of 
protection have changed over time, along with the formal requirements for 
protection,58 and even the definitions of protected elements of a work.59 Thus, 
it is that as recently as 2013, the courts found themselves ruling on an 
ownership dispute over the copyright in different elements of the Superman 
character,60 who first appeared in comic books in 1938.61 In some cases, 
courts have split up the rights in works in ways that would strike a layperson 
as bizarre, such as by distinguishing ownership of a character’s catchphrases 
 
54. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (including “numerical symbols” in the definition of literary work); 
Apple Comput., Inc. v. Franklin Comput. Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253–54 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding 
that computer operating systems are not per se precluded from copyright). See generally Dennis S. 
Karjala, Copyright Protection of Operating Software, Copyright Misuse, and Antitrust, 9 CORNELL 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 161 (1999) (discussing the copyrightability of computer operating systems); 
Julian Velasco, Note, The Copyrightability of Nonliteral Elements of Computer Programs, 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 242 (1994) (examining the relevant tests that courts have used to determine 
whether the nonliteral elements of computer programs can be the basis of a copyright). 
55. See, e.g., Verified Complaint for Injunctive and Other Relief at 7–8, Whitmill v. Warner 
Bros. Entm’t Inc. (E.D. Mo. Apr. 28, 2011) (No. 4:11-cv-752), 2011 WL 2038147 (seeking to enjoin 
the defendant from using Mike Tyson’s facial tattoo designed by the plaintiff). For more information 
on copyright protection of tattoos, see generally Christopher A. Harkins, Tattoos and Copyright 
Infringement: Celebrities, Marketers, and Businesses Beware of the Ink, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 313 (2006). 
56. See Kelley v. Chicago Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 292 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that the garden 
is not protected under the 1976 Act due to the lack of authorship and fixation). 
57. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (stating that copyright in a work created on or after January 1, 1978, 
has a copyright lifetime consisting of the life of the author plus 70 years). 
58. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 194–96 (2003) (discussing the various changes in 
copyright duration from 1790 until 2003); Kevin A. Goldman, Comment, Limited Times: Rethinking 
the Bounds of Copyright Protection, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 705, 708–18 (2006) (tracing changes in 
copyright law from 1790 until modern times). 
59. See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991) 
(acknowledging that factual compilation can be protected if it exhibits originality in the selection 
and arrangement); Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 419 (2d Cir. 1985) 
(recognizing the copyrightability of conceptually separable artistic aspects of a utilitarian article 
that are otherwise unprotected); Shine v. Childs, 382 F. Supp. 2d 602, 608–09 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(concluding that architectural models are entitled protection). 
60. DC Comics v. Pac. Pictures Corp., 545 F. App’x 678, 680–81 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that 
the copyright termination notice of the heir of one of the cocreators of the Superman character was 
invalid). 
61. Calvin Reid, DC Marks 80 Years of ‘Action Comics’ and Superman with Hardcover Tribute, 
PUBLISHERS WKLY. (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/industry-
news/comics/article/76612-dc-marks-80-years-of-action-comics-and-superman-with-hardcover-
tribute.html [https://perma.cc/T6BC-PV5P]. 
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from the character’s characteristic wardrobe.62 The result is that users of 
expressive works can never be sure which works are under legal protection 
and which have fallen into the public domain and at what point the legal 
protection, if it exists, expires. The informational haze shrouding the 
copyright terrain has even spawned the odd legal phenomenon of “orphan 
works”—works that are subject to copyright protection but whose 
rightsholders are unknown.63 
Together, legal vagueness, unclear information in rights, and a number 
of market practices combine to create an atmosphere in which copyright 
rights can be infringed in numerous ways that are not willful and perhaps not 
even readily detectable. 
It is against this background that we turn to a description of several 
different kinds of infringement, with a focus on the ways rights may be 
infringed without willfulness. We will argue infra that these several kinds of 
infringements can be roughly grouped into three categories—willful 
infringements, inadvertent infringements, and “standard” infringements.64 
B. The Different Types of Infringements 
1. Willful and Blatant Infringements.—We begin with the infringements 
that the law must combat most strongly: willful and blatant infringements of 
copyrights. Notwithstanding all the ambiguity surrounding copyright law, 
there are many cases that are easy. Counterfeit DVDs, for instance, are 
produced wholesale by pirates who know that they are copying a copyrighted 
work (a motion picture) and then distributing it to the public without any 
authorization.65 The counterfeiters are not confused about the illegality of 
their actions. They are simply relying on not getting caught. 
 
62. See Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. X One X Prods., 644 F.3d 584, 599, 603 (8th Cir. 2011) 
(discussing how a character’s clothing or catchphrase could have different ownership than the 
character itself). 
63. An “orphan work” is a copyrighted work whose author cannot be identified or located. 
Orphan Works and Mass Digitization, 77 Fed. Reg. 64555 (Oct. 22, 2012); U.S. COPYRIGHT 
OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS 1 (2006); Olive Huang, Note, U.S. Copyright Office Orphan 
Works Inquiry: Finding Homes for the Orphans, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 265, 265 (2006). Orphan 
works cannot be used unless the fair use doctrine applies. See Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 
755 F.3d 87, 95 (2d Cir. 2014) (stating that the fair use doctrine “allows the public to draw upon 
copyrighted materials without the permission of the copyright holder in certain circumstances”). 
64. See infra subpart III(A). 
65. See United States v. Liu, 731 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 2013) (stating the importance of 
proving willful action in a counterfeit case); United States v. Beltrán, 503 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2007) 
(stating that copying a DVD that has an FBI copyright warning on it constitutes willful 
infringement). For more information on counterfeit DVDs and criminal infringement of copyright, 
see generally Michael M. DuBose, Criminal Enforcement of Intellectual Property Laws in the 
Twenty-First Century, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 481 (2006) and Rebecca E. Hatch, Criminal 
Infringement of Copyright Under 17 U.S.C.A. § 506, in 120 AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE: PROOF OF 
FACTS 181, 191 (Jennifer J. Chen ed., 3d ed. 2011). 
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Every year there are numerous enforcement actions against such willful 
and blatant infringements.66 Consider the enforcement action that was 
brought against Danny Ferrer.67 Ferrer, together with others, operated the 
piracy website www.buyusa.com, where he sold illicit copies of copyrighted 
software products, such as Adobe and Autodesk (among others).68 Ferrer’s 
infringing activities lasted several years, causing the rightsholders harm that 
totaled nearly $20 million.69 Ultimately, Ferrer was sentenced to a prison 
term of six years and was ordered to pay $4.1 million in restitution.70 In 
addition, he was forced to forfeit a whole variety of luxury goods he had 
acquired from the proceeds of his illegal activities.71 
Although Ferrer’s case is extreme in terms of the punishment meted out 
to him, it is highly representative of infringing activities concerning 
copyrighted software, movies, and music files on the Internet. Infringements 
of copyrights in such works often consist of a knowing and willful mass 
production of illegal copies of protected works, and, thereafter, the knowing 
and willful offering of those copies to the public at a heavily discounted price. 
As we explicate further in Part III, we classify these kinds of 
infringements “willful infringements.”72 
2. Unknowing Infringements.—At the other end of the spectrum are 
inadvertent infringements: instances where the infringement is due to a 
reasonable and good-faith interpretation of the law and facts that leads the 
infringer to believe she is doing nothing wrong. As we will see, there are 
many different instances where someone may use a copyrighted work in a 
forbidden manner, yet lack culpability. Roughly speaking, the innocence of 
the infringer may stem from two different kinds of mistakes. The infringer 
 
66. See, e.g., United States v. Backer, 134 F.2d 533, 535 (2d Cir. 1943) (affirming conviction 
of the defendant for willfully infringing copyrighted figurines for profit); People v. Santiago, 9 
Misc. 3d 197, 201 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2005) (holding that the First Amendment did not preclude 
prosecution for unlicensed selling of counterfeit DVDs); Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Federal 
Courts Order Seizure of Three Website Domains Involved in Distributing Pirated Android Cell 
Phone Apps (Aug. 21, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/federal-courts-order-seizure-three-
website-domains-involved-distributing-pirated-android-cell [https://perma.cc/6QWC-4EYT] (“The 
seizures are the result of a comprehensive enforcement action taken to prevent the infringement of 
copyrighted mobile device apps.”); see also Comment, Willful Copyright Infringement: In Search 
of a Standard, 65 WASH. L. REV. 903, 907–09 (1990) (discussing various standards to measure 
willfulness). 
67. Jerry Markon, Florida Man Gets Six Years in Prison for Software Piracy, WASH. POST 
(Aug. 26, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/25
/AR2006082500511.html [https://perma.cc/Y9TC-ZTTG]. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. See infra subpart III(A). 
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may make a mistake of law, or incorrect predictions about the way courts are 
likely to interpret the law that lead her to believe that the law permits her 
activity. Alternatively, the infringer may make a mistake of fact or believe 
certain things about the quality of a work or the available licenses that lead 
her to believe that her activity is not infringing. 
The most extreme type of inadvertent infringement is one where even 
after committing an act that the court will eventually find to have been 
infringing, the infringer is unlikely to know that she did anything wrong. 
In theory, such unknowing infringements should not be possible. 
Although the Copyright Act does not explicitly require it, case law is quite 
clear in demanding that any case of infringement be supported by a finding 
of “copying in fact.”73 That is, according to the courts, an infringement does 
not take place unless “the defendant, in creating its own rival work, used the 
plaintiff’s material as a model, template, or even inspiration.”74 Yet, despite 
this clear element of the case law, courts have signaled their willingness to 
find an infringement where the defendant was not aware of the plaintiff’s 
work, and did not consciously use it even as inspiration. 
The extreme example of this kind of infringement is provided by the 
famous case of Bright Tunes Music v. Harrisongs. Bright Tunes involved a 
suit brought against George Harrison, the former Beatle, alleging that his hit 
song “My Sweet Lord” infringed Bright Tunes’ copyright in The Chiffons’ 
“He’s So Fine.”75 In response to the suit, Harrison attested that he did not 
copy The Chiffons’ song or borrow from it.76 The court explained that while 
it believed Harrison, he had nevertheless infringed Bright Tunes’ copyright: 
Seeking the wellsprings of musical composition—why a composer 
chooses the succession of notes and the harmonies he does—whether 
it be George Harrison or Richard Wagner—is a fascinating inquiry. It 
is apparent from the extensive colloquy between the court and 
Harrison covering forty pages in the transcript that . . . Harrison [was 
not] conscious of the fact that [he was] utilizing the He’s So Fine 
theme. . . .  
 What happened? I conclude that the composer, in seeking musical 
materials to clothe his thoughts, was working with various 
possibilities. As he tried this possibility and that, there came to the 
surface of his mind a particular combination that pleased him as being 
one he felt would be appealing to a prospective listener; in other 
words, that this combination of sounds would work. Why? Because 
 
73. 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.01(B) (2019). 
74. Id. § 13.01 (footnotes omitted). 
75. Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 
1976), aff’d sub nom. ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1983). 
76. Id. at 179–80. 
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his subconscious knew it already had worked in a song his conscious 
mind did not remember. . . . Did Harrison deliberately use the music 
of He’s So Fine? I do not believe he did so deliberately.77 
The court reasoned that Harrison was probably exposed to The 
Chiffons’ song that was released in 1963 and was subconsciously influenced 
by it when he wrote his song that was released to the public in November of 
1970. That Harrison was unaware of this fact was of no help to him.78 
Subconscious copying also played a key role in the case of Three Boys 
Music Corp. v. Bolton.79 This case proceeded on a claim that Michael 
Bolton’s song entitled “Love is a Wonderful Thing” plagiarized a song with 
the same title by the Isley Brothers.80 Naturally, the identical title of the two 
songs could (and did) raise suspicion of illicit behavior, but it turns out that 
129 songs bearing the same title were registered at the time of the suit.81 That 
Bolton’s song was released more than 30 years after the original did not save 
him.82 Nor did it help that the Isley Brothers’ song did not attain meaningful 
commercial success.83 In fact, the court used Bolton’s admission of his 
admiration of the Isley Brothers to corroborate the jury’s finding that Bolton 
copied the Isley Brothers’ song.84 
To be sure, the court did not rule that Bolton had infringed the Isley 
Brothers’ copyright; it only upheld a jury finding that Bolton had infringed. 
Nonetheless, it is difficult to read the court’s opinion and remain unimpressed 
with how a borderline case of plausible “copying” can suffice to uphold a 
ruling of infringement. According to the Court: 
The appellants contend that the Isley Brothers’ theory of access 
amounts to a “twenty-five-years-after-the-fact-subconscious copying 
claim.” Indeed, this is a more attenuated case of reasonable access and 
subconscious copying than [Bright Tunes Music]. In this case, the 
appellants never admitted hearing the Isley Brothers’ “Love is a 
Wonderful Thing.” That song never topped the Billboard charts or 
even made the top 100 for a single week. The song was not released 
on an album or compact disc until 1991, a year after Bolton and 
 
77. Id. at 180. 
78. Id. at 181 (“This is . . . infringement of copyright, and is no less so even though 
subconsciously accomplished.”). 
79. 212 F.3d 477 (9th Cir. 2000). 
80. Id. at 480. 
81. Id. at 484. 
82. See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, The Freedom to Copy: Copyright, Creation, and Context, 41 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 477, 536 (2007) (“The composition in which Bolton participated was also far 
removed from the Isley Brothers song in time as well . . . .”). 
83. See id. (explaining that the Isley Brothers’ song was never listed on a Top 100 chart). 
84. See id. (“Bolton’s acknowledged reverence of the Isley Brothers and the existence of a 1991 
CD version of the Isley Brothers song are thus used to bolster fairly tenuous assumptions about 
access and subconscious infringement.”). 
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Goldmark wrote their song. Nor did the Isley Brothers ever claim that 
Bolton’s and Goldmark’s song is so “strikingly similar” to the Isley 
Brothers’ that proof of access is presumed and need not be proven. . . . 
. . . . 
 Teenagers are generally avid music listeners. It is entirely plausible 
that two Connecticut teenagers obsessed with rhythm and blues music 
could remember an Isley Brothers’ song that was played on the radio 
and television for a few weeks, and subconsciously copy it twenty 
years later.85 
Needless to say, there is a vast gulf between blatant pirating of 
copyrighted works and subconscious copying of the same. 
As we explicate further in Part III, we classify these kinds of 
infringements as “inadvertent infringements.”86 
3. Infringements Related to Questions About the Work’s Protection.—
Infringements vary not only due to the behavior of the infringer. They also 
vary due to the nature of the copyrighted work. Sometimes, the application 
of copyright law to a particular work is obvious. Copyright law, for instance, 
clearly protects the text of a novel.87 But the law’s protection does not end 
there. The novel’s characters88 and style89 may be protected, as may other 
“nonliteral” aspects of the work. Indeed, every protected work contains both 
protected and unprotected parts. The text of a history book is protected but 
 
85. Three Boys Music, 212 F.3d at 484. 
86. See infra subpart III(A). 
87. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (extending copyright protection to “literary works”); Salinger 
v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 83 (2d Cir. 2010) (affirming that the texts of the two works in question are 
substantially similar); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1259 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(considering whether injunctive relief was appropriate for alleged infringement of the novel Gone 
With the Wind). For further discussion, see Douglas Y’Baro, Aesthetic Ambition Versus Commercial 
Appeal: Adapting Novels to Film and the Copyright Law, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 299, 315–20 
(1998) (discussing whether a film’s adoption of a novel’s text is prohibited by copyright law). 
88. See Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., 988 F. Supp. 2d 879, 893 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (holding 
that characters that have not yet entered the public domain are protectable), aff’d, 755 F.3d 496 (7th 
Cir. 2014). But cf. Sinicola v. Warner Bros., Inc., 948 F. Supp. 1176, 1185 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating 
that the less developed a character is, the less likely he is to be protected by copyright law); Note, 
The Protection Afforded Literary and Cartoon Characters Through Trademark, Unfair 
Competition, and Copyright, 68 HARV. L. REV. 349, 357 (1954) (reasoning that the use of a literary 
character in a context similar to the original is almost conclusive evidence of copyright 
infringement, but recognizing that a less developed character is less likely to be protected). 
89. See Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1399–401 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(holding that a book describing the O.J. Simpson murder trial written in the style of the plaintiff’s 
children’s books is not entitled to fair use defense); Hassett v. Hasselbeck, 177 F. Supp. 3d 626, 633 
(D. Mass. 2016) (holding that style is a component of the overall concept and feel of a literary work, 
which is protected). But see Douglas v. Osteen, 317 F. App’x 97, 99 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[T]he use of 
a particular writing style or literary method is not protected by the Copyright Act.”); McMahon v. 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 1296, 1302 (E.D. Mo. 1980) (“A writer may not claim a monopoly 
on a particular writing style by virtue of a copyright.”). 
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not its historical facts.90 The plot of a movie is protected but not insofar as 
the plot is unoriginal or consists of scènes à faire.91 Someone may copy 
elements of a work she thought were unprotected, and find out later to her 
chagrin that the court considers her copying an infringement. 
In some cases, the statute explicitly divides the work into protected and 
unprotected parts. For example, the copyright in architectural works is 
limited to “overall form as well as the arrangement and composition of spaces 
and elements in the design [of a building], but . . . not . . . individual standard 
features.”92 A more controversial example is provided by the law of copyright 
protection of works of industrial design—“pictorial, graphic, and sculptural 
works” that are “useful articles” in the jargon of the Copyright Act.93 Such 
works are protected only in their “form” but not their “mechanical or 
utilitarian aspects,” and only to the degree that their design “incorporates 
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately 
from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of 
the article.”94 An espresso machine may thus enjoy copyright protection for 
part of the way it looks: for its form, but not its mechanical aspects, and even 
then, only to the degree that the artistic aspects of the form are identified 
separately from the utilitarian aspects. Years of litigation about such items as 
 
90. See Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1543 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that only the expression 
and not the analysis of history is protected by copyright law); Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 
650 F.2d 1365, 1369–70 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that facts underlying a literary work cannot be 
appropriated through copyright law); Effie Film, LLC v. Pomerance, 909 F. Supp. 2d 273, 298 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that historical facts or interpretations do not count towards substantial 
similarity analysis). 
91. See, e.g., Stromback v. New Line Cinema, 384 F.3d 283, 296 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that 
depiction of parties, alcohol, and wild behavior are scènes à faire in a story about a college 
fraternity); Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1362–64 (9th Cir. 1990) (discounting claims of 
infringement based on copying of “‘scenes à faire’—that is, scenes that flow naturally from a basic 
plot premise,” while allowing other copying claims to proceed to trial). “Scènes à faire refers to 
‘incidents, characters or settings which are as a practical matter indispensable, or at least standard, 
in the treatment of a given topic.’” Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 
607, 616 (7th Cir. 1982) (quoting Alexander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)). 
92. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
93. Id.; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, as reprinted in 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
94. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476. 
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belt buckles,95 bicycle racks,96 streetlamps,97 mannequin heads,98 and 
cheerleading uniforms99 have failed to draw a clear line.100 
An additional complication is created by the fact that copyrights are time 
limited, but the protected aspects of works are not created instantaneously at 
a single moment. Consider the litigation surrounding the copyrighted 
character Sherlock Holmes. Sir Arthur Conan Doyle was a writer in the late 
nineteenth and early-twentieth century whose most famous works concerned 
the adventures of the fictional detective Sherlock Holmes. The first Sherlock 
Holmes story appeared in 1887 and the last in 1927.101 It is evident that the 
majority of the Sherlock Holmes stories have long been in the public domain. 
However, the Doyle estate has successfully upheld the copyright in ten short 
stories published from 1923 and onward.102 The result is that any marginal 
accretions to the Sherlock Holmes character that appear in those final short 
stories are still under copyright protection. Warner Brothers could lawfully 
use Sherlock Holmes as the central character in its 2009103 and 2011104 films, 
without a license from the Doyle estate, so long as it avoided any references 
 
95. See Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993 (2d Cir. 1980) 
(protecting belt buckles whose artistic features are primary and the utilitarian features subsidiary). 
96. See Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1146–47 (2d Cir. 1987) 
(determining that the bicycle rack was not entitled to protection under the independent-artistic-
judgment test). 
97. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 202, 217 (1954) (holding that the bases for lamps in the 
form of male and female dancing figures did not invalidate the plaintiff’s registration of copyright); 
Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Seattle Lighting Fixture Co., 345 F.3d 1140, 1142 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing 
the protection of table lamps); Sunset Lamp Corp. v. Alsy Corp., 698 F. Supp. 1146, 1148 (S.D.N.Y. 
1988) (discussing the protectability of floor lamp designs). 
98. See Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 414 (2d Cir. 1985) (recognizing 
the copyrightability of conceptually separable artistic aspects of a utilitarian article that are 
otherwise unprotected). 
99. See Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1016 (2017) (holding 
that the design on the relevant cheerleading uniforms warranted copyright protection because it 
could be “perceived as a two- or three-dimensional work of art separate from the useful article” and 
because it qualified “as a protectable pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work”). 
100. See Pivot Point Int’l, Inc. v. Charlene Prods., Inc., 372 F.3d 913, 921 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(noting that the statutory language with respect to the copyrightability of utilitarian articles “has 
presented the courts with significant difficulty”). For more discussions of the topic, see generally 
John B. Fowles, The Utility of a Bright-Line Rule in Copyright Law: Freeing Judges from Aesthetic 
Controversy and Conceptual Separability in Leicester v. Warner Bros., 12 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 301 
(2005) and Barton R. Keyes, Alive and Well: The (Still) Ongoing Debate Surrounding Conceptual 
Separability in American Copyright Law, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 109 (2008). 
101. Works by Arthur Conan Doyle Featuring Sherlock Holmes, CONAN DOYLE INFO, https://
www.conandoyleinfo.com/sherlock-holmes/list-of-sherlock-holmes-fiction/ [https://perma.cc
/TNX8-XLYB]. 
102. Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., 988 F. Supp. 2d 879, 893 (N.D. Ill. 2013), aff’d, 755 
F.3d 496 (7th Cir. 2014) (extending protection to a later version of the Sherlock Holmes character 
when the protection term of the original version of the round character had expired). 
103. SHERLOCK HOLMES (Warner Bros. Pictures 2009). 
104. SHERLOCK HOLMES: A GAME OF SHADOWS (Warner Bros. Pictures 2011). 
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to Holmes’s development in a character in the final ten short stories. 
Likewise, a different studio could today make its own original Sherlock 
Holmes films, as long as it avoided using the last ten short stories, or any 
aspects of the character that were original to the Warner Brothers’ films (or 
other still-protected depictions in films and television programs). In other 
words, when considering the Sherlock Holmes character, like any other 
copyrighted work created over time, one must view the work as layered; 
although the work may seem a seamless whole, in fact it is comprised of 
different pieces built upon one another, some of which enjoy copyright 
protection, and others of which do not. 
Figuring out whether one has copied a protected part of a work is a 
perennial difficulty in the law of copyright. As Judge Learned Hand famously 
observed in the 1930 case Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.,105 “[n]obody 
has ever been able to fix that boundary [between protected elements and 
unprotected “abstractions”], and nobody ever can.”106 Indeed, in Nichols, 
which concerned the claim that the plot of the play The Cohens and the Kellys 
infringed upon the plot of the earlier play Abie’s Irish Rose, Judge Hand was 
forced to recite the plots of both plays at length, before dismissing the case 
with such imprecise observations as: 
[W]e think both as to incident and character, the defendant took no 
more—assuming that it took anything at all—than the law allowed. 
The stories are quite different[:] 
. . . [T]he theme was too generalized an abstraction from what she 
wrote . . . . 
 . . . [And] as to her characters[, they are mere] . . . stock figures.107 
The difficulty in applying the law is perhaps best illustrated by 
comparing two cases involving stories about the continuing adventures of 
well-known characters. The first, Warner Bros. Pictures Inc. v. Columbia 
Broadcasting System,108 involved the fictional detective Sam Spade and other 
more minor fictional characters who appeared in the Sam Spade adventure 
The Maltese Falcon.109 Sam Spade was the main character in Dashiell 
Hammett’s novel The Maltese Falcon, published in serial form from 1929–
1930.110 Later in 1930, Hammett (and his publisher Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.) 
sold all television, radio, and movie rights to Warner Brothers; Warner 
Brothers adapted the novel into several different film versions, of which the 
 
105. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930). 
106. Id. at 121. 
107. Id. at 121–22. 
108. 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954). 
109. Id. at 948. 
110. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 102 F. Supp. 141, 143 (S.D. 
Cal. 1951), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954). 
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most successful by far was the 1941 film The Maltese Falcon, which starred 
Humphrey Bogart.111 The controversy developed in 1946, when Hammett 
granted the Columbia Broadcasting System the right to use the character Sam 
Spade (and several other characters) in a radio drama entitled “Adventures of 
Sam Spade” that was later broadcast weekly in half-hour episodes until 
1950.112 Warner Brothers sued, claiming that the radio shows infringed upon 
the rights in the character Sam Spade it had acquired when it purchased the 
radio rights to The Maltese Falcon.113 However, the district court and then 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Hammett and Columbia 
Broadcasting System on the grounds that the character Sam Spade was not a 
copyrighted work included in The Maltese Falcon; indeed, according to the 
court, the character Sam Spade could not be copyrighted at all since he was 
merely the “vehicle[] for the story told, and the vehicle[] did not go with the 
sale of the story.”114 
Nearly the opposite approach was exhibited by a district court in 
California in Anderson v. Stallone115—litigation concerning the character 
Rocky Balboa, and other, more minor, fictional characters that appeared in 
the Rocky film series.116 Timothy Anderson, a fan of the Rocky film series, 
was inspired by Sylvester Stallone’s brief comments during a promotional 
tour of Rocky III regarding the potential plot of Rocky IV.117 Building on 
Stallone’s vague idea of a fight in Moscow between Rocky Balboa and a 
Soviet fighter, Anderson wrote a 31-page summary of the plot of a film (a 
“treatment,” in the jargon of the film industry) involving a fight between 
Rocky and a highly trained Soviet fighter, which he then delivered to studio 
executives.118 According to Anderson, Stallone’s final script for Rocky IV 
copied the plot of Anderson’s treatment.119 The court ruled for Stallone.120 
 
111. Id. at 143–44, 149. Dashiell Hammett wrote three more short stories featuring Sam Spade 
in 1932, but the stories were not part of the deal with Warner Brothers. Id. at 144. The 1941 film 
was nominated for three Academy Awards, and it was eventually recognized by the American Film 
Institute as one of the greatest movies ever made. See The 14th Academy Awards: 1942, 
OSCARS.ORG, https://www.oscars.org/oscars/ceremonies/1942 [https://perma.cc/EWP4-GAHV] 
(listing three Academy Award nominations for The Maltese Falcon: Actor in a Supporting Role, 
Outstanding Motion Picture, and Writing (Screenplay)); AFI’s 100 Greatest American Movies of 
All Time, AFI, http://www.afi.com/100years/movies.aspx [https://perma.cc/8NXY-PN7P] (ranking 
The Maltese Falcon as the twenty-third on the list); AFI’s 100 Greatest American Movies of All 
Time: 10th Anniversary Edition, AFI, http://www.afi.com/100years/movies10.aspx [https://
perma.cc/6E7R-NT8S] (ranking The Maltese Falcon as the thirty-first on the list). 
112. Warner Bros. Pictures, 102 F. Supp. at 144. 
113. Warner Bros. Pictures, 216 F.2d at 948–49. 
114. Id. at 950. 
115. No. 87–0592 WDKGX, 1989 WL 206431 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 1989). 
116. Id. at *1. 
117. See id. (describing the sequence of events). 
118. Id. at *1, *14–15. 
119. Id. at *1. 
120. Id. at *18. 
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While purporting to apply the same standard as the Warner Brothers 
decisions,121 the court ruled that “the Rocky characters were so highly 
developed and central to the three movies made before Anderson’s treatment 
that they ‘constituted the story being told’” and were, therefore, “[e]ntitled 
[t]o [c]opyright [p]rotection [a]s [a] [m]atter [o]f [l]aw.”122 Consequently, 
ruled the court, Anderson could not enjoy copyright protection for any of his 
treatment; Anderson’s treatment was nothing more than an unauthorized 
derivative work which unlawfully used Stallone’s copyrighted characters.123 
It was Anderson, rather than Stallone, who had infringed. 
Against this background of legal uncertainty, one might easily infringe, 
yet fail to identify the legal consequences until the court’s ruling. Does a 
television commercial infringe the copyrights in the James Bond films when 
it shows a tuxedoed American male spy engaged in flirtatious banter with an 
attractive female companion while driving a Honda del Sol to escape a villain 
in a helicopter, all to the sounds of “loud, exciting horn music”?124 The 
district court in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v. American Honda Motor Co. found 
the question sufficiently vexing that it rejected Honda’s motion for summary 
judgment and left the question of infringement to the jury.125 Certainly, it is 
possible to rule that Honda infringed upon the copyright in the James Bond 
character as depicted in the films owned by MGM (though not non-MGM 
films and not the Ian Fleming novels about James Bond). However, it is also 
possible to conceive of a court ruling that Honda did not copy anything 
protected by copyright. 
Perhaps the most controversial nonliteral infringements are those that 
infringe the “look and feel” of the copyrighted work. A “look and feel” 
infringement, unlike an infringement of nonliteral aspects like the plot of a 
 
121. Id. at *6–7. The court acknowledged some confusion in the doctrine, noting that the Second 
Circuit follows a different test for determining whether copyrighted characters are copyrightable, 
and that subsequent litigation in the Ninth Circuit has raised questions about whether the ruling in 
the Sam Spade litigation is still good law. Id. at *6. The court decided that the characters would be 
copyrighted under all the competing tests, making it unnecessary to determine which test is required 
in the Ninth Circuit. Id. at *8. 
122. Id. at *7–8. 
123. Id. at *8–9. 
124. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287, 1298 (C.D. Cal. 
1995). The court described the ad as follows: 
Defendants’ “Escape” commercial features a young, well-dressed couple in a Honda 
del Sol being chased by a high-tech helicopter. A grotesque villain with metal-encased 
arms jumps out of the helicopter onto the car’s roof, threatening harm. With a 
flirtatious turn to his companion, the male driver deftly releases the Honda’s 
detachable roof (which Defendants claim is the main feature allegedly highlighted by 
the commercial), sending the villain into space and effecting the couple’s speedy get-
away. 
Id. at 1291. 
125. Id. at 1304 (denying summary judgment under the intrinsic test because “the jury must 
make a factual determination”). 
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film, is the most ethereal type of infringement. In cases that find the defendant 
to have infringed upon the “look and feel” or “concept and feel” of a 
copyrighted work, the courts suffice with the decision that the infringing 
work “feels” excessively like the original.126 Consider, for instance, the case 
of Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co.127 The case involved two 
companies that produced greeting cards with simple illustrations and banal 
greeting card sentiments. Roth complained that United had copied seven 
greeting cards.128 The court originally expressed some doubt that Roth’s 
cards were sufficiently original to warrant copyright—the cards were, after 
all, greeting cards expressing greeting card sentiments—but the court 
ultimately ruled that the cards were protected by copyright.129 When it came 
to the question of infringement, Roth could not point to anything specific that 
had been copied, but the court nevertheless reversed a judgment in favor of 
United and found that United had violated Roth’s copyright by copying the 
“total concept and feel” of Roth’s cards.130 The court thought that the 
combinations of simple pictures and trite messages in United’s cards were so 
similar to the combinations of simple pictures and trite messages in Roth’s 
cards that an “ordinary observer” would view the Roth cards as having been 
impermissibly copied.131 
Perhaps the most famous “concept and feel” case is Sid & Marty Krofft 
Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp.,132 which considered 
whether McDonald’s had infringed the Kroffts’ copyright in their H.R. 
Pufnstuf television series when the fast food company produced a series of 
commercials showing the fantasy “McDonaldland.”133 While acknowledging 
that the McDonald’s commercials did not literally copy anything in the H.R. 
Pufnstuf series, and that they did not copy nonliteral elements such as plot or 
characters, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals nevertheless upheld a ruling 
in favor of the Kroffts due to the McDonald’s commercial’s similarity to the 
“total concept and feel” of the H.R. Pufnstuf series.134 According to the court, 
it was essential that the target audience was children because this meant the 
court had to consider “the impact of the respective works upon the minds and 
imaginations of young people.”135 The court then determined that 
notwithstanding the “subjective and unpredictable nature of children’s 
 
126. See infra notes 128–38 and accompanying text. 
127. 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970). 
128. Id. at 1107. 
129. Id. at 1109. 
130. Id. at 1109–11. 
131. Id. at 1110. 
132. 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977). 
133. Id. at 1160. 
134. Id. at 1166–67. 
135. Id. at 1166. 
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responses,”136 an audience of children would necessarily view the 
commercials as having copied the “total concept and feel” of H.R. Pufnstuf.137 
Elements of the maddening vagueness of “total concept and feel” cases 
threaten to leak into other infringement cases due to the standards used by 
courts to determine impermissible similarity. Consider, for instance, the 
standard developed by Judge Learned Hand in the 1960 case Peter Pan 
Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp.138 and used ever since in the Second 
Circuit. Hand explained that the way to determine whether a fabric pattern 
had infringed on the copyrighted pattern of a different fabric was by asking 
whether “the ordinary observer . . . would be disposed to overlook [the 
disparities], and regard [the patterns’] aesthetic appeal as the same.”139 
Clearly, classifying infringements of nonliteral elements of copyrighted 
works is not an easy task. Certainly, infringements of this sort are not as 
culpable as willful and knowing piracy. Yet, often, one cannot view the 
infringements as inadvertent or innocent. As we explicate further in Part III, 
we include most of these kinds of infringements within a category we call 
“standard infringements.”140 However, in light of the vagueness of the 
doctrine, there may be extreme cases where the infringement involves 
nothing more than adoption of the “look and feel” of the copyrighted work. 
In those cases, we suggest that the infringer should be seen as no more 
culpable than an inadvertent infringer. 
4. Infringements Related to Questions About the Scope of Legal 
Protection.—Uncertainty in the law lies at the heart of other types of 
infringements as well. Some infringements are distinguished by questions 
about the scope of the law’s protection rather than the scope of the work. It 
is clear, for example, that the actual text of a novel is part of the copyrighted 
work protected by the law, even if there may be disputes about the parts of 
the plot that are protected. Nonetheless, not every use of the text constitutes 
infringement. The fair use doctrine, for instance, gives critics the rights to 
quote a small portion of the text in a book review without a license from the 
author.141 Unfortunately, as with so many other aspects of copyright law, 
 
136. Id. at 1116. 
137. Id. at 1166–67. 
138. 274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960). 
139. Id. at 489. 
140. See infra subpart III(A). 
141. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012); see also Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 517 (7th Cir. 
2002) (stating that through the fair use doctrine a book review can copy a short quote from the 
original work without a license from the author); Folsom v. March, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. 
Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901) (“Thus, for example, no one can doubt that a reviewer may fairly cite 
largely from the original work, if his design be really and truly to use the passages for the purposes 
of fair and reasonable criticism.”); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 73, at § 13.05 (providing an 
overview of the standards governing fair use doctrine). 
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limitations on the scope of copyright are far from obvious, and users of 
copyrighted works frequently make mistakes. 
Consider the extreme case of “appropriation art.” Appropriation art 
consists of artistic works that use preexisting works with little or no 
transformation;142 in the terminology of the Tate Gallery, appropriation art is 
“the more or less direct taking over . . . [of] a real object or even an existing 
work of art” “into a [new] work of art.”143 Appropriation artist Sherrie 
Levine, for instance, photographs the preexisting photographs of other 
photographers.144 Her work After Walker Evans, created and displayed in 
1981, consisted of Levine’s photographs of a set of famous Walker Evans 
photographs of poor rural Americans during the Great Depression.145 The 
Evans estate naturally accused Levine of copyright infringement, though the 
matter was ultimately settled without litigation.146 
Appropriation artists have often claimed that their works do not infringe 
on the grounds that the works are “fair uses” of the original. The courts have 
sometimes accepted and sometimes rejected such claims. Jeff Koons has 
been repeatedly sued for copyright infringement, and while his fair use claims 
prevailed in Blanch v. Koons,147 they failed in Rogers v. Koons,148 United 
Feature Syndicate v. Koons,149 and Campbell v. Koons.150 The most striking 
recent ruling on appropriation art was issued by the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals in the case of Cariou v. Prince.151 Richard Prince, the defendant, was 
an appropriation artist who copied thirty of Cariou’s photographs of 
Jamaicans and transformed them into Prince’s style “by among other things 
painting ‘lozenges’ over their subjects’ facial features and using only portions 
of some of the images.”152 As one might expect of an appropriation artist, 
Prince denied any intent for his works to be transformative, saying that “he 
 
142. See Jennifer T. Olsson, Note, Rights in Fine Art Photography: Through a Lens Darkly, 70 
TEXAS L. REV. 1489, 1514–15 (1992) (discussing an example of appropriation art). 
143. Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 699 (2d Cir. 2013). 
144. After Walker Evans: 4, THE MET, http://www.metmuseum.org/art/collection/search
/267214 [https://perma.cc/EPP8-RDLB]; see also AFTERSHERRIELEVINE.COM, http://
www.aftersherrielevine.com/ [https://perma.cc/EUD6-VPTP] (“Sherrie Levine rephotographed 
Walker Evans’ photographs from the exhibition catalog ‘First and Last.’”). 
145. Amy Adler, Fair Use and the Future of Art, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 559, 606 (2016). 
146. Niels Schaumann, Fair Use and Appropriation Art, CYBARIS, Summer 2015, at 112, 122; 
Carmen Winant, Sherrie Levine’s ‘Mayhem’: A Retrospective of the Original Fake at the Whitney, 
WNYC (Nov. 9, 2011), http://www.wnyc.org/story/169656-sherrie-levines-mayhem-retrospective-
original-fake-whitney/ [https://perma.cc/NW38-FVYV] (“Believing her photographs to be 
copyright infringement, the estate bought the entire sweep to prevent anyone else from doing so.”). 
147. 467 F.3d 244, 246 (2d Cir. 2006). 
148. 960 F.2d 301, 309 (2d Cir. 1992). 
149. 817 F. Supp. 370, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
150. No. 91 Civ. 6055(RO), 1993 WL 97381, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 1993). 
151. 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013). 
152. Id. at 699. 
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‘do[es]n’t really have a message,’ that he was not ‘trying to create anything 
with a new meaning or a new message.’”153 Nonetheless, the court found fair 
use with respect to twenty-five of Cariou’s images used by Prince,154 while 
“express[ing] no view as to” Prince’s claim of fair use for the other five 
images.155 
Fair use claims are not limited to appropriation art, of course. Fair use 
claims have been made regarding multimillion dollar parody films,156 exact 
copying of software in order to reverse engineer it,157 advertising 
campaigns,158 the compilation of photocopied materials for instructional 
courses,159 the copying of television broadcast for later viewing at home,160 
the recording of pieces of music in order to listen to them on different 
devices,161 the mass digitization of books,162 systematic miniaturization and 
transmission of digital images,163 the photocopying and archiving of 
academic articles for future research,164 the display of a copyrighted image in 
the background of a television show set for a total of twenty-seven seconds,165 
and the quotation of fewer than approximately 300 words from a 2,000-word 
book in a news story.166 Of course, only some of these fair use claims have 
 
153. Id. at 707. 
154. Id. at 712. 
155. Id. The parties ultimately reached a settlement regarding the final five images. Brian 
Boucher, Landmark Copyright Lawsuit Cariou v. Prince Is Settled, ART IN AM. (Mar. 18, 2014), 
http://www.artinamericamagazine.com/news-features/news/landmark-copyright-lawsuit-cariou-v-
prince-is-settled/ [https://perma.cc/4AC7-243M]. 
156. See Warner Bros. Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 654 F.2d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that 
defendant’s parody film was sufficiently distinct from plaintiffs’ movie to defeat a copyright-
infringement claim). 
157. Compare Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 847 (Fed. Cir. 1992) 
(affirming the lower court’s ruling that the software in question was substantially similar enough to 
the plaintiffs’ program to violate copyright law), with Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 
1510, 1527 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding in favor of defendant’s fair use defense). See also Sony Comput. 
Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 599 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that defendant’s reverse 
engineering of the disputed computer software was protected fair use). 
158. Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 110 (2d Cir. 1998); Triangle Publ’ns, 
Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1172 (5th Cir. 1980); Straus v. DVC 
Worldwide, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 2d 620, 623 (S.D. Tex. 2007). 
159. E.g., Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1237 (11th Cir. 2014); Princeton 
Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1383 (6th Cir. 1996); Basic Books, Inc. v. 
Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1526 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
160. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 425 (1984) 
(discussing the legality of recording publicly broadcasted television shows and movies). 
161. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014 (9th Cir. 2001), as amended 
(Apr. 3, 2001), aff’d, 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002). 
162. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 207 (2d Cir. 2015). 
163. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 815 (9th Cir. 2003). 
164. Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 914–15 (2d Cir. 1994). 
165. Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 71–73 (2d Cir. 1997). 
166. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 542, 545 (1985). 
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been successful, but for those unfamiliar with the line of case law, the 
outcomes are difficult to predict: who would guess, for example, that copying 
the entire text of five million books would be found fair use,167 while the 
quotation of a mere 300–400 words from a 2,000-word book would not?168 
Fair use is not the only legal tool that may grant users the ability to copy 
protected works in a manner that would otherwise be seen as infringing. The 
Copyright Act is replete with mandatory licenses and exceptions granting 
users the rights to use works in such diverse situations as face-to-face 
classroom instruction,169 advertising,170 and background music in retail 
outlets.171 Some of the statutory licenses are straightforward, but many others 
are hideously complex and have led to repeated litigation over such 
apparently trivial questions as the square footage of the retail space in which 
the musical work was being played.172 
The uncertain boundaries of the many statutory licenses, and especially 
that of the notoriously vague fair use provision, lie at the heart of many 
infringement cases. Many users of copyrighted works reasonably believe that 
their use is permitted by the statutory exceptions to copyright protection. 
And, indeed, often the courts vindicate these beliefs with a finding of fair use 
or other statutory privilege. 
The culpability of the user in cases where the user improperly relies on 
statutory exceptions is mixed. On the one hand, the user often knows that the 
acts she is committing are prima facie within the monopoly rights of the 
copyright owner, or, at the very least, that they skate very close to the owner’s 
rights. Google, for instance, clearly knew that when it scanned millions of 
books for its Google Books project, it was copying many copyrighted works 
without permission from the copyright owners.173 Likewise, Aereo, in 
copying over-the-air transmissions of copyrighted programs and then 
streaming them to customers, knew that its activities could be characterized 
as forbidden copying and public performance.174 Yet, while the users know 
they are potentially infringing, they also have good reason to believe they are 
not violating the law. Google had a more than plausible claim that its activity 
was within the ambit of fair use, while Aereo had a strong argument that its 
 
167. Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 229. 
168. Harper, 471 U.S. at 545, 569. 
169. 17 U.S.C. § 110(1) (2012). 
170. Id. § 113(c). 
171. Id. § 110(5). 
172. See Sailor Music v. Gap Stores, Inc., 668 F.2d 84, 86 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that the 
defendant store’s square footage was too large to fall under Congress’s exemption for performance 
of copyrighted works in private homes). 
173. See Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 207 (2d Cir. 2015) (stating that Google 
copied millions of books without a license). 
174. See Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2503 (2014) (finding that Aereo 
copied programming without licenses). 
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copying was permitted by fair use and its transmissions were not “public” or 
“volitional.” As it happened, Google’s gamble was successful: its claim of 
fair use was vindicated first by the trial court175 and then by the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals.176 Aereo’s gamble, on the other hand, was not. 
After Aereo prevailed in the First and Second Circuit Courts of Appeals, the 
Supreme Court ultimately ruled that Aereo’s model was too similar to that of 
cable television and therefore a forbidden public performance.177 
In short, the culpability of infringers is best seen as somewhere between 
the innocence of “subconscious” infringers and the willfulness of pirates. As 
we explicate further in Part III, we classify most of these kinds of 
infringements as “standard infringements.”178 
5. Infringements Related to Questions About the Identity of the Owner.—
One of the most unusual sources of infringements is user confusion regarding 
the ownership of a copyrighted work. Even where one is certain that a work 
is subject to copyright, and likely still within the protection of the copyright 
law––as with a piece of music that is clearly of recent origin––one may still 
not know to whom the rights belong. 
Modern changes in copyright law are partly to blame for this situation. 
Prior to 1978, copyright law required notice of copyright ownership to 
accompany general distributions of copies of the work to the public, which 
meant that often one could discover the initial owner of copyright in a work 
by examining a copy.179 However, even in the era before 1978, knowledge of 
copyright ownership was limited. For instance, copyright ownership could be 
transferred after distribution of the work, but the copies would not reflect this 
fact. In any event, changes in the law in recent decades have exacerbated, 
rather than ameliorated, the problem. After January 1, 1978 (the effective 
date of the Copyright Act of 1976), and especially after the Berne Convention 
Implementation Act of 1988, the notice requirement was gradually 
eliminated.180 Today, there is no notice requirement at all, meaning that a 
copy of a protected work can bear no indication whatsoever of the identity of 
the copyright owner, or even the fact that the work is protected by copyright 
law, yet still enjoy the full protection of copyright law.181 Additionally, while 
 
175. Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d, 804 
F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015). 
176. Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 229–30. 
177. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2511. 
178. See infra subpart III(A). 
179. See I. Fred Koenigsberg, The 1976 Copyright Act: Advances for the Creator, 26 CLEV. ST. 
L. REV. 515, 525–26 (1977) (describing the notice requirements in the 1976 Copyright Act). 
180. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 7, 102 Stat. 
2853, 2857–58 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 401 (2012)) (relaxing the notice requirements). 
181. See generally Annemarie Bridy, Three Notice Failures in Copyright Law, 96 B.U. L. REV. 
777 (2016) (describing the lack of stringent notice requirements in current copyright law). 
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there are circumstances in which the owner must register copyright 
ownership, failure to do so is never fatal. A search through the copyright 
registry may thus provide no indication of ownership, even though the work 
is protected. 
The difficulty of identifying ownership of copyrighted works has 
become known as the “orphan works” problem. A 2015 report of the 
Copyright Office defined orphan works based on its 2006 report as “original 
work[s] of authorship for which a good faith prospective user cannot readily 
identify and/or locate the copyright owner(s) in a situation where permission 
from the copyright owner(s) is necessary as a matter of law.”182 While the 
Copyright Office described the scope of the problem as “elusive,” it 
acknowledged that the “orphan works problem is real.”183 The orphan works 
problem occurs when potential users have encountered a work of authorship 
of which they wish to make use but cannot figure out to whom it belongs. 
The situation may arise because no identifying information appears in the 
copy of the work examined by the potential user or because the information 
is out of date (due to transfers, etc.). While in some cases the potential user 
will throw up her hands and avoid using the work, in others, she will take a 
chance and use the work, risking a future infringement suit. 
Much speculation surrounds the topic of orphan works. According to 
one published estimate, up to 90% of all works currently protected by 
copyright law are “orphaned.”184 As technology changes, and the number of 
digital copies of copyrighted works moves into the trillions,185 the number of 
copies without sufficient identifying information will doubtless grow. 
Given the hype surrounding the problem of orphan works,186 it may be 
surprising to learn that the problem is even worse than usually described. The 
reason for this is the layered nature of copyrighted works. Almost inevitably, 
every copyrighted work contains within itself other copyrighted works. A 
novel, for instance, contains a plot and characters, which can be separately 
copyrighted and protected. This means that even if a novel is sufficiently well 
identified to allow potential users to obtain licenses from the owner of the 
 
182. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS DIGITIZATION 9 (2015). 
183. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 63, at 7. 
184. Aaron C. Young, Copyright’s Not So Little Secret: The Orphan Works Problem and 
Proposed Orphan Works Legislation, 7 CYBARIS 202, 203 (2016). 
185. See id. at 204 (discussing the billions of photographs taken and shared online each year). 
186. See Vigdis Bronder, Saving the Right Orphans: The Special Case of Unpublished Orphan 
Works, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 409, 410 (2008) (discussing problems specific to unpublished 
orphan works). See generally David R. Hansen et al., Solving the Orphan Works Problem for the 
United States, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1 (2013) (discussing various solutions to the problems 
presented by orphan works); Randal C. Picker, Private Digital Libraries and Orphan Works, 27 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1259 (2012) (discussing orphan works as they relate to use by public 
libraries); Huang, supra note 63 (discussing the status of orphan works following the United States 
Copyright Office inquiry in 2005). 
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novel as a whole, it will not be entirely clear who owns the component pieces 
of the novel that the user wishes to license. Thus, for instance, if Alice wishes 
to utilize a portion of a film whose copyright owner is known to her, she will 
still have to worry about the question of whether the film incorporates plot 
elements or characters from a work owned by someone else.187 
Beyond these basic problems in identifying owners, several copyright 
doctrines—and in particular, the termination right—further exacerbate the 
problem of tracing ownership. The 1976 Copyright Act granted authors who 
transfer their copyright (and, in limited cases, other copyright owners)188 the 
right to cancel the transfer several decades later and reclaim ownership in the 
work.189 The 1976 Act’s termination right applies retrospectively as well as 
prospectively190: transfers that took place before the effective date of the 1976 
Act can be terminated as well. Additionally, while the 1976 Act’s termination 
right was new, even under older copyright law, there were instances in which 
a transferee might lose ownership of a copyright that had been lawfully 
purchased. Under the 1909 Act, for instance, copyright terms were 
compound; that is to say, creators of a copyrighted work would get two 
distinct terms of protection—an initial 28-year term and an additional 28-
year term if the renewal paperwork was properly filed.191 A peculiarity of 
case law under the 1909 Act provided that a creator could sell all her rights 
in a copyrighted work (for the full 56 years), but if she died before the onset 
of the renewal term, the transfer of the second 28-year term would fail, and 
ownership would revert to the heirs of the original owner.192 In other words, 
under the old law, as well as the new, even where someone “owns” all of a 
copyright, there might still be someone else lurking about who has a residual 
right to take it away. 
As a result of all these factors, copyright “clearance” is extremely 
difficult and sometimes impossible. Despite the best efforts of a user, it may 
not be possible to figure out from whom to license a work. 
In general, there is a large category of cases in which users wish to use 
works without having any clear idea of the identity of the owner or how to 
go about getting permission. If the frustrated user takes the chance of using 
the work without a proper license, she is clearly not an inadvertent infringer. 
 
187. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 238 (1990) (finding infringement when a film used 
the unique setting, characters, plot, and sequence of events from an earlier work). 
188. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2012). 
189. Id. § 203(a)(3). 
190. Id. 
191. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 23, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080. 
192. See, e.g., Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373, 375 (1960) (holding 
that the heirs or next of kin of a deceased author “are among those to whom § 24 has granted the 
renewal right, irrespective of whether the author in his lifetime has or has not made any assignment 
of it”). 
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However, just as clearly, it does not make sense to treat her as culpable to the 
same degree as a willful infringer. We suggest that these cases belong under 
the category of “standard infringements.” 
6. Infringements Related to Questions About the Scope of a License.—It 
might seem odd to suggest that the scope of licenses can constitute a fertile 
source of mistaken infringements. One might suspect that the licensing of 
copyrighted works is the quintessential sign that no infringement has taken 
place, or that if a work has been infringed, it is due to malice. After all, if the 
right to the copyrighted work has been licensed, it would seem necessary for 
the user and the owner to have reached some meeting of the minds as to how 
the copyrighted work will be used. Yet, in practice, it turns out that even 
where users hold a license, infringements due to mistakes about the scope of 
licenses are legion. 
Mistakes about the scope of licenses are more frequent than one might 
expect. For example, in 2014, Getty Images released 35 million copyrighted 
images from its catalog to the Internet, making them available, free of charge, 
for noncommercial use.193 In exchange, Getty required users to embed the 
images with Getty’s software embedding tool in order to ensure that proper 
credit is given and to monitor users and show them ads.194 Users, however, 
are often unaware of the existence of limitations and restrictions on the use 
of content or simply miscomprehend them. Furthermore, they are sometimes 
implicated in infringement activities by trusted third parties, such as web 
designers.195 
A recent empirical study by Hong Luo and Julie Holland Mortimer of 
infringements involving digital images reveals that “infringement of digital 
images is often unintentional. Unintentional infringement may arise either 
through misinformation about licensing obligations, or because third parties 
infringe on behalf of a user (e.g., a web designer includes an image on a 
firm’s website).”196 
Specifically, Luo and Mortimer report that 85% of infringers claimed 
that they were unaware of the infringement or that it arose as a consequence 
of the actions of hired third parties.197 The percentage among small firms was 
even higher and reached 88%.198 Interestingly, they also note that the price 
 
193. Getty Images Makes 35 Million Photos Free to Use, BRITISH J. PHOTOGRAPHY (Mar. 5, 
2014), https://www.bjp-online.com/2014/03/getty-images-makes-35-million-images-free-in-fight-
against-copyright-infringement/ [https://perma.cc/3F78-7ZM2]. 
194. Id. 
195. Hong Luo & Julie Holland Mortimer, Copyright Infringement in the Market for Digital 
Images, 106 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 140, 140 (2016). 
196. Id. 
197. Id. at 142. 
198. Id. 
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requested by copyright owners for the use of the content, i.e., the license fee, 
had no effect on the level of infringement.199 
The ambiguity of licenses is compounded by the long-lasting nature of 
copyrights. In the course of the century and more that copyrights can last, 
technology can change, rendering the meaning of earlier copyright 
agreements uncertain. Does a distribution license for a film include the 
possibility of distribution by video cassette or streaming by internet?200 Do 
publication rights for a book include the right to publish it electronically?201 
Such questions have proved a fertile source of litigation. 
A further degree of confusion is added by the case law permitting 
unwritten implied licenses. The Copyright Act requires an attestation in 
writing for all “transfer[s]” of copyright rights,202 but the writing requirement 
does not apply to the granting of nonexclusive licenses.203 In such cases, the 
behavior of the parties may create a license whose terms are unknown and 
unknowable. Consider, for example, the case of Effects Associates, Inc. v. 
Cohen.204 Cohen, “a low-budget horror movie mogul,” asked Effects 
Associates, a special effects studio, to produce special effects footage for the 
movie The Stuff.205 While the studio produced the footage as promised, and 
Cohen used the footage in the movie, Cohen refused to pay the agreed-upon 
consideration.206 According to the Copyright Act, transfers of copyright 
ownership require a written agreement.207 Cohen had obtained no such 
written agreement.208 Effects Associates sued for copyright infringement and 
 
199. Id. at 142–43. 
200. See, e.g., Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481, 
485–86 (2d Cir. 1998) (challenging Disney’s use of Stravinsky’s The Rite of Spring in newly 
published video cassettes of Fantasia); Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 275 
F. Supp. 2d 543, 549 (D.N.J. 2003) (examining whether an official distributor of trailer clips in 
video-rental stores could stream those clips online); see also Konrad Gatien, Internet Killed the 
Video Star: How In-House Internet Distribution of Home Video Will Affect Profit Participants, 13 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 909, 923–24 (2003) (discussing in-house internet 
distribution of home videos); Dominique R. Shelton, How Licensing Issues Are Affecting Recent 
Media Developments, L.A. LAW., June 2007, at 17, 17 (asking the question: “Does the right to 
distribute entertainment content through one channel include the right to distribute that content 
through a later-developed channel with a different underlying technology?”). 
201. See, e.g., HarperCollins Publishers LLC v. Open Road Integrated Media, LLP, 7 F. Supp. 
3d 363, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (holding that the initial author’s granting of publishing rights gave the 
publisher exclusive right to license the e-book version); Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books LLC, 
150 F. Supp. 2d 613, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that the licensee to the right to publish in book 
form could not succeed on a copyright-infringement claim against someone publishing the work in 
electronic form). 
202. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2012). 
203. Id. § 204(e). 
204. 908 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990). 
205. Id. at 555. 
206. Id. at 556. 
207. Id. 
208. Id. 
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fraud.209 In a surprising decision, Judge Kozinski ruled that there was no 
copyright infringement since Cohen had an implied nonexclusive license to 
use the disputed footage in his movie.210 While Effects Associates still had 
the right to payment according to the contract, it could not object to the use 
of its copyrighted footage. 
Not only may licenses be created by behavior; they may also be 
rescinded by the same. An interesting illustration is provided by the recent 
case of Garcia v. Google Inc.,211 in which an actress named Cindy Lee Garcia 
sought to enjoin the distribution on YouTube of the controversial film 
Innocence of Muslims on the grounds that she owned a copyright in her acting 
performance in the relatively small part in which she appeared in the film.212 
Garcia had signed a contract before acting in the film, but the contract had 
not explicitly resolved the issue of copyright in Garcia’s performance and she 
argued that any license she might have granted was invalid, as it had been 
obtained by fraud (she had been misled about the nature of the film and the 
way her performance was to be used).213 Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals ruled en banc that Garcia enjoyed no copyright in her 
performance, rendering the question of license moot.214 However, the 
different court opinions entertained various theories of implied license, 
including the possibility that Garcia had granted an implied license to the 
filmmakers and that the filmmakers had granted Garcia an implied license to 
perform the copyrighted screenplay.215 
The ambiguity of written licenses together with the possibility of 
implied licenses creates a high likelihood of mistaken infringement due to 
misinterpretation of licenses. The user who violates the license after 
misreading or misunderstanding it clearly bears some responsibility for her 
infringement, but it does not make sense to treat her as culpable to the same 
degree as a willful infringer. We suggest that these cases belong under the 
category of “standard infringements.” 
II. Copyright’s Liability Regime 
As we have seen, copyright infringements involve different degrees of 
blameworthiness and impose varying degrees and types of harms on 
copyright owners. Nonetheless, the Copyright Act has a single standard of 
liability and a single standard compensatory scheme. 
 
209. Id. 
210. Id. at 559. 
211. 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
212. Id. at 736–37. 
213. Id. at 738–39, 741 n.5. 
214. Id. at 741–44. 
215. Id. at 743. 
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Liability under the Copyright Act is predicated on a strict liability 
standard. Neither the state of mind of the infringer nor her cost of avoidance 
matter for liability determinations. The roadmap for finding infringement, 
according to the Copyright Act, is simple and strict. Section 106 of the Act 
reserves to the owner of a copyright the exclusive right to perform certain 
actions, such as copying the work.216 Section 501 of the Act, in turn, defines 
infringement as “violat[ing] any of the exclusive rights of the copyright 
owner.”217 For courts, this language means that a person becomes an infringer 
if he or she performs one of the actions regarding the copyrighted work (such 
as copying) that the statute reserves for the owner, without a proper license 
from the copyright owner or from the statute itself.218 Other than to be sure 
that the infringer actually knew of and somehow used (in a manner protected 
by § 106) the protected work, courts do not interest themselves in the state of 
mind of the infringer. Indeed, as Nimmer writes, “[r]educed to most 
fundamental terms, there are only two elements necessary to the plaintiff’s 
case in an infringement action: ownership of the copyright by the plaintiff 
and copying by the defendant.”219 
Once infringement is established, the Copyright Act imposes a single 
standard compensatory scheme. Under § 504, all infringements that give rise 
to liability under § 501 entitle a copyright owner to recover her actual harm 
or the infringer’s profits—at her choice.220 Likewise, all infringements entitle 
the plaintiff to seek injunctive relief.221 
The only exception is statutory damages. If a copyright owner wishes to 
receive statutory damages in lieu of actual ones, courts must consider the 
blameworthiness of the defendant in setting statutory-damages awards.222 
Specifically, the Copyright Act sets forth three different categories of 
infringements—innocent, standard, and willful—and establishes a different 
recovery range for each category by varying the floor and the cap of the 
damages for each of the categories.223 
In this Part, we explore this cookie-cutter liability regime by looking 
first at the strict liability standard for establishing whether an infringement 
has occurred; second, at the standardized remedies that apply to all 
 
216. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). 
217. Id. § 501. 
218. See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59, 60 (3d Cir. 1986) (the 
public-performance right); London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 174 (D. Mass. 
2008) (the public-distribution right); Walt Disney Prods. v. Filmation Assocs., 628 F. Supp. 871, 
875 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (the reproduction right). 
219. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 73, at § 13.01 (footnotes omitted). 
220. 17 U.S.C. § 504. 
221. Id. § 502. 
222. Id. § 504(c). 
223. Id. 
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infringements; and finally at the harm caused by standardized remedies. We 
also explore the unusual cases in which extant law permits tailoring remedies 
to the defendant’s culpability. 
A. The Liability Standard 
Liability under the Copyright Act arises whenever a person performs 
one of the exclusive acts granted to authors—namely, reproduces a work, 
adapts it, distributes it to the public, publicly performs or displays it or 
digitally performs it (in the case of sound recording), or authorizes such an 
act without permission from the rightsholder.224 It is well established that the 
Act adopts a strict liability regime.225 Acts are the touchstone of liability 
under the Act. The state of mind of the infringer is irrelevant. 
It was not always like this. As Anthony Reese points out, historically, 
the Copyright Acts exempted innocent or unknowing infringements from 
liability.226 He explains that “[t]he copyright system originally made most 
types of innocent infringement easily avoidable, and where innocent 
infringement was difficult to avoid the imposition of liability in fact 
depended on a defendant’s culpable mental state.”227 
The 1976 Copyright Act, however, omits reference to the mental state 
of the infringer, and it does not reference the infringer’s degree of culpability. 
The Act’s definition of infringements is laconic; it simply states that any 
violation of an author’s exclusive right triggers liability.228 The courts’ 
interpretation of the statutory language, however, premises liability on the 
purely objective standard of “copying in fact.”229 This is not an accident. As 
Shyamkrishna Balganesh points out, “[d]ating back to its origins, copyright 
law has operated principally by granting its holder the exclusive right to copy 
 
224. Id. §§ 106, 501. There are also instances in which importation of a work can constitute an 
infringement. Id. § 602. 
225. See Dane S. Ciolino & Erin A. Donelon, Questioning Strict Liability in Copyright, 54 
RUTGERS L. REV. 351, 351 (2002) (“In copyright’s strict liability scheme, the infringer’s 
faultlessness or culpability is of anomalously little relevance.”); Comment, Internet Copyright 
Infringement and Service Providers: The Case for a Negotiated Rulemaking Alternative, 35 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 219, 248 (1998) (stating that the Copyright Act imposes strict liability for 
unauthorized copying). But see Steven Hetcher, The Immorality of Strict Liability in Copyright, 17 
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 2 (2013) (arguing that although it has historically been accepted 
that copyright is a strict liability scheme, due to the fair use doctrine, it is actually closer to a fault 
standard). 
226. R. Anthony Reese, Innocent Infringement in U.S. Copyright Law: A History, 30 COLUM. 
J.L. & ARTS 133, 133–34 (2007) (detailing the history of innocent liability in the United States). 
227. Id. at 133. 
228. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a). 
229. See Paycom Payroll, LLC v. Richison, 758 F.3d 1198, 1204 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting 
JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 291 (3d ed. 2010)) 
(stating that part of the analysis for determining copyright infringement is “whether the defendant 
copied from the plaintiff,” otherwise referred to as “copying in fact”). 
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a creative work of authorship, and actions for copyright infringement have 
ever since revolved entirely around a showing of copying.”230 
Practically, as construed by the courts, liability does not even require 
positive proof of copying. Courts will suffice with circumstantial evidence of 
copying, relying on proof of “access” combined with “similarity.”231 
Concretely, a copyright owner who sues for infringement needs to show that 
the defendant had access to the putatively infringing work, in the sense that 
she was exposed to it or was likely to be exposed to it,232 and that the 
defendant’s work bears similarity to that of the plaintiff.233 Access and 
similarity, in other words, suffice as a replacement proof of actual copying. 
Once these twin elements have been established by the plaintiff, the 
defendant can defeat the presumption of copying by raising and proving the 
defense of “independent creation.”234 And, while it is true that if a defendant 
can show that she did not copy her work from the plaintiff she should prevail 
in court,235 a mere proof of access and similarity by a copyright holder 
suffices to shift the burden of proof to the defendant, who must show lack of 
 
230. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Normativity of Copying in Copyright Law, 62 DUKE L.J. 
203, 205 (2012) (emphasis omitted); see also Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying 
in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1421, 1427 (2009) (“[A]ctual copying is still a fundamental first 
step in determining copyright infringement.”). 
231. E.g., Laureyssens v. Idea Grp., Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 139 (2d Cir. 1992) (“It is now an axiom 
of copyright law that actionable copying can be inferred from the defendant’s access to the 
copyrighted work and substantial similarity between the copyrighted work and the alleged 
infringement.”); Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 206 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that 
defendant’s access to the copyrighted work and substantial similarity between the copyrighted work 
and allegedly copied piece were together sufficient to constitute copyright infringement). But see 
Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1162–63 (9th Cir. 
1977) (stating that relying on circumstantial proof of access combined with proof of similarity 
would be “untenable” and would go beyond “the scope of copyright protection”). 
232. See O’Keefe v. Ogilvy & Mather Worldwide, Inc., 590 F. Supp. 2d 500, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008) (“In order to support a claim of access, a plaintiff must offer significant, affirmative and 
probative evidence that an alleged infringer had a reasonable probability . . . of being exposed to his 
work.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 73, at § 13.02(A) 
(“[E]ven if evidence is unavailable to demonstrate actual viewing, proof that the defendant had the 
opportunity to view (when combined with probative similarity) is sufficient . . . to conclude that 
copying as a factual matter has occurred.” (footnotes omitted)). 
233. See O’Keefe, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 517–18 (finding that the plaintiff needed to establish 
substantial similarity among unique features in order to sustain a copyright-infringement action); 
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 73, at § 13.03(A) (stating that substantial similarity must exist 
between the copyrighted work and the allegedly copied work to sustain a copyright action). 
234. See Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 901 (7th Cir. 1984) (“[T]wo works may be identical in 
every detail, but, if the alleged infringer created the accused work independently . . . then there is 
no infringement.”); Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Intellectual Property Defenses, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 1483, 1494 (2013) (“If, perchance, a person independently creates a work that is 
identical to a preexisting work, she will not be liable for copyright infringement. Rather, both works 
would be entitled to copyright protection.”). 
235. See Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc., 132 F.3d 1167, 1169 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that 
“[t]he Copyright Act forbids only copying; if independent creation results in an identical work, the 
creator of that work is free to sell it”). 
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copying. Failure on the part of the plaintiff to lift this burden will result in a 
finding of copying. 
In fact, courts have construed liability under the Copyright Act so 
broadly as to cover cases where the court was satisfied that the infringer never 
consciously copied anything, as in the infamous case of Bright Tunes Music 
v. Harrisongs, mentioned previously.236 In that case, as we noted, the court 
believed George Harrison’s testimony that he had not consciously copied 
anything from The Chiffons’ “He’s So Fine,” but the court still found the 
similarity so overwhelming as to support a finding of infringement.237 
While casting the net of infringement widely, the statute recognizes only 
one type of infringement. The statute does not provide for degrees of 
infringement or for other categorizations of infringements. All 
infringements—whatever the circumstances giving rise to the violation of 
copyright rights—are seen by the statute as the same. 
B. Remedies for Infringement 
The civil remedies for infringement are laid out by § 504 of the 
Copyright Act, and for the most part, they are not differentiated by 
culpability. Monetary damages for an infringement come in three categories: 
the copyright owner’s “actual damages,” any “additional profits” of the 
infringer, and “statutory damages.”238 In addition to the monetary damages, 
courts may award injunctive relief as “reasonable to prevent or restrain 
infringement,”239 and it may order impoundment and destruction of 
infringing copies as well as articles by means of which the infringing copies 
could be produced.240 In one very narrowly tailored set of circumstances the 
court can award a punitive “additional award of two times the amount of the 
license fee that the proprietor of the establishment concerned should have 
paid the plaintiff for such use during the preceding period of up to 3 years.”241 
Finally, the court may award costs and attorneys’ fees.242 
The statute fails to provide clear guidelines for measuring the central 
building blocks of monetary damages—actual damages and lost profits. 
Actual damages are defined simply and unhelpfully as “the actual damages 
suffered by [the copyright owner] as a result of the infringement.”243 Lost 
profits are defined, only slightly more helpfully, as “any profits of the 
 
236. See supra notes 28–33 and accompanying text. 
237. See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text. 
238. 17 U.S.C. § 504(a) (2012). 
239. Id. § 502(a). 
240. Id. § 503. 
241. Id. § 504(d). 
242. Id. § 505. 
243. Id. § 504(b). 
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infringer that are attributable to the infringement and are not taken into 
account in computing the actual damages.”244 Section 504(b) adds the useful 
evidentiary rule that in calculating profits, gross revenues, as proved by the 
plaintiff, are presumptively equal to profits, and it is up to the defendant to 
attempt to reduce this amount by proving that the revenues were the result of 
something other than infringement, or that there were relevant deductible 
expenses.245 Both heads of damage—actual damages and lost profits—are 
available in all cases of infringement, irrespective of culpability, unless the 
plaintiff elects to take statutory damages in their place. 
It is only in a handful of instances that the Copyright Act looks in the 
direction of culpability. 
First, there is a narrow punitive damages provision that relates to 
§ 110(5) of the Act.246 This exceedingly narrow provision is not easily 
explained. Section 110(5) of the Act, in relevant part, states that businesses 
may perform (“communicat[e]” to the public, in the language of the statute) 
nondramatic musical works subject to a variety of conditions.247 Essentially, 
§ 110(5) allows retail businesses, as well as bars and restaurants, to play the 
radio or television for their customers without getting a separate license from 
the owners of the copyrighted works being shown or played. Section 110(5) 
imposes very detailed and strict conditions on the businesses: they can only 
use the exemption if the business falls within certain size limitations (for 
instance, for an establishment other than a food service or drinking 
establishment, 2,000 gross square feet of space not including customer 
parking)248 and uses certain equipment (for example, an establishment other 
than a food service or drinking establishment may use not more than four 
audiovisual devices, no more than one per room, and none with a diagonal 
screen size greater than fifty-five inches).249 Section 504(d) states that where 
a defendant business owner claims that the infringement was justified by 
§ 110(5), but the court concludes there were no “reasonable grounds” for the 
owner’s believing that the § 110(5) exemption applied, the court should add 
an additional, punitive damage award to any other damage award given by 
the court.250 The punitive damage award is set by a fixed formula: “two times 
the amount of the license fee that the proprietor of the establishment 
concerned should have paid the plaintiff for [the nonexempt performances] 
 
244. Id. 
245. Id. 
246. Id. § 504(d). The statute does not use the term “punitive,” though the punitive nature of the 
award is plain. 
247. Id. § 110(5). 
248. Id. § 110(5)(B)(i). 
249. Id. § 110(5)(B)(i)(II). 
250. Id. § 504(d). 
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during the preceding period of up to 3 years.”251 It is difficult to know what 
to make of this narrow punitive damages provision or to understand why this 
one case warrants such exceptional treatment. 
The second instance in which the Copyright Act adjusts remedies 
according to culpability is broader but limited solely to statutory damages. 
Statutory damages are available to plaintiffs only in lieu of actual damages 
and lost profits.252 However, statutory damages may also be awarded 
punitively by the court in addition to actual damages and lost profits in cases 
where the “infringement was committed willfully.”253 The Copyright Act 
generally provides that statutory damages may be elected by a prevailing 
copyright owner in the amount of $750–$30,000 (as the court deems just) in 
lieu of the actual damages and profits related to infringements of any work.254 
However, if the owner proves the infringement was committed willfully, the 
statutory damages may be increased to $150,000.255 
This is the clearest use of culpability in the civil section of the Copyright 
Act,256 but almost no guidelines are provided to courts in deciding what is 
willful and how to choose damages. In fact, while the Act provides that 
certain provisions of false information can create a rebuttable presumption of 
willfulness, it explicitly notes that this presumption should not be read more 
broadly to “limit[] what may be considered willful infringement.”257 This 
lack of clarity has led scholars to criticize the statutory-damages provision as 
“frequently arbitrary, inconsistent, unprincipled, and sometimes grossly 
excessive” as applied by courts.258 
The third and final instance in which civil remedies are adjusted for 
culpability similarly relates to statutory damages but operates in the opposite 
direction. Where courts find an infringer was innocent (i.e., the “infringer 
was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an 
infringement of copyright”), the statutory damages may be reduced to as little 
as $200.259 In some very narrow cases of infringement (an infringer who 
believed the use fell under the category of fair use, who was acting on behalf 
of a nonprofit educational institution, library, or public-broadcasting entity, 
and who also meets other restrictive conditions), the court is instructed to 
 
251. Id. 
252. See id. § 504(c) (providing that the copyright owner may “elect” to recover statutory 
damages instead of actual damages and profits). 
253. Id. § 504(c)(2). 
254. Id. § 504(c)(1). 
255. Id. § 504(c)(2). 
256. Culpability is relevant to criminal actions under the Copyright Act. See id. § 506 (requiring 
willful infringement for criminal offenses). 
257. Id. § 504(c)(3). 
258. Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 23, at 441. 
259. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). 
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remit statutory damages.260 The narrow remission provision is difficult to 
explain, but the broader structure of innocent infringement also appears 
without statutory guidance. 
C. What’s Wrong with Uniform Standards of Liability 
As we demonstrated, copyright doctrine contains a high degree of 
uncertainty. It is easy for potential users of a work to mistakenly infringe due 
to misunderstandings about the legal protections afforded works or the facts 
surrounding the work, such as ownership. At the same time, outside the arena 
of statutory damages, copyright remedies apply uniformly across the many 
types of infringements. 
The uncertainty inherent in copyright law undermines its utilitarian goal 
of promoting expressive creativity. Ideally, the copyright system should be 
designed to maximize total expressive output at the lowest possible cost. This 
means that while copyright law should grant copyright owners the legal tools 
to force potential users to pay for licenses to use the works, the law should 
also aim to reduce costs of transacting about rights and enforcing them, as 
well as to reduce the effect of copyright-infringement actions in 
unnecessarily deterring follow-on creation. It is particularly important, 
therefore, that the Copyright Act adopt legal directives that minimize 
information costs to potential users of copyrighted works and, in particular, 
ameliorate the potential for overdeterrence that accompanies legal 
uncertainty. 
As several leading law and economics scholars have pointed out, 
ambiguous legal doctrines invariably result in overdeterrence, which, in turn, 
prompts defendants to invest excessively in precautions.261 The reason is 
simple. When facing a vague standard, actors cannot know for certain how 
much to invest in precautions taken in order to avoid liability. But they know 
that there is no symmetry between under- and over-investment. 
Underinvestment in precautions exposes one to the full brunt of civil (and 
criminal) liability. Overinvestment, by contrast, buys one immunity. Hence, 
under conditions of uncertainty, a rational actor would always choose to err 
on the side of safety and overinvest in precautions. Accordingly, the 
 
260. Id. 
261. See, e.g., John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance 
with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 995 (1984) (noting that when the “probability [of 
liability] declines as defendants take more care, then defendants may tend to overcomply”); Richard 
Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 279, 
289 (1986) (stating a defendant’s “reason for overcomplying is to reduce the likelihood of being 
found liable”); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 
111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 873 (1998) (observing that “if injurers are made to pay more than for the 
harm they cause, wasteful precautions may be taken . . . and risky but socially beneficial activities 
may be undesirably curtailed”). 
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ambiguity of copyright law works as a one-way ratchet that will in many 
cases lead to the under-use of copyrighted works. 
Users of copyrighted expression can respond to the vagueness of 
copyright law by adopting two types of precautions. When information and 
transaction costs are sufficiently low,262 and users are aware of the 
copyrighted nature of the material they wish to use, users may attempt to 
secure a license from the copyright owner.263 When information and 
transaction costs are high,264 users will copy less protected expression than 
they are legally entitled to or refrain from using expression altogether. 
Importantly, the latter will lead users to forgo the use of not only legally 
protected copyrighted expression but also unprotected expression. This is 
because users will not always know whether expression is protected, but the 
cautious strategy is to respond to the lack of knowledge by avoiding use. 
Both responses are socially wasteful.265 It is critical to understand that 
under extant law, the second response probably dominates the first. Given 
the volume of copyrighted content and the lack of a cost-effective way to 
readily identify protected content and its proprietors, it makes more sense 
from a purely utilitarian standpoint to abstain from creating. Given the 
informational haze that engulfs the world of copyright law, licensing only 
gets one very limited insurance against liability. A potential creator may 
scour the domain of copyrighted content and identify several rightsholders, 
whose copyrights may be infringed by her creation. Securing licenses from 
the relevant rightsholders will not bar lawsuits from other rightsholders of 
whom our potential author was not aware, or even from rightsholders 
identified by the potential author but whom the potential author neglected to 
contact because she mistakenly resolved that her work does not infringe upon 
the copyright in theirs. Moreover, obtaining a license is not a guarantee that 
the license actually covers the relevant use or that the user has properly 
identified the copyrighted materials. 
 
262. On the connection between fair use and transaction costs, see Wendy J. Gordon’s classic, 
Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its 
Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1628–30 (1982), for a discussion on high transaction costs 
as a prerequisite to a fair use finding. 
263. For excellent discussion, see generally James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion 
in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882 (2007) and Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual 
Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEXAS L. REV. 1031 (2005). 
264. See Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Value of Giving Away Secrets, 89 VA. L. 
REV. 1857, 1858–61 (2003) (discussing the effect of strategic holdups on bargaining between 
rightsholders and potential improvers in patent law). The discussion applies with equal force to 
negotiations over copyrights. 
265. Any overinvestment in precautions is socially wasteful. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE 
COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 29 (1970) (stressing that a point exists at which precautionary measures will 
“incur[] costs in achieving the reduction that are greater than the reduction is worth”). 
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The staggered remedies we propose can reduce these harmful effects in 
two ways. First, reducing remedies due to the user’s lack of familiarity with 
information at the disposal of the owner creates a welcome dynamic in which 
owners are incentivized to push information about their copyrighted works 
and licensing schemes to the public. Second, reducing remedies due to the 
user’s misunderstandings, whether they stem from uncertainty about 
copyright law or about knowledge the owner has about the work, reduces the 
deterrent effect of copyright-infringement remedies upon use of copyrighted 
works. This benefits society by encouraging socially beneficial use of 
copyrighted works and by reducing the costs of enforcing copyright law. 
III. A New Liability Regime 
As we established in Part I, copyright infringements come in many 
different varieties. Yet, as we have shown in Part II, the law treats all of them 
in the same way for purposes of assigning liability and fashioning relief, with 
one exception: suits for statutory damages. More importantly, we established 
that the uniform treatment of all infringements, other than for statutory-
damages purposes, is at odds with the goal of promoting expressive 
creativity. In this Part we offer a blueprint for legal design that takes account 
of the differences among various types of infringement and is therefore better 
suited for advancing the goals of the copyright system. 
Our reform plan consists of two interlocking steps. First, we aim to 
extend copyright law’s classification of infringements for purposes of 
statutory damages to all relief in the realm of copyright. Concretely, we call 
for the classification of all infringement cases into three categories: 
inadvertent infringements, standard infringements, and willful infringements. 
These three categories of infringements should serve as the basis for all 
remedial action ordered by courts in infringement cases. Second, we specify 
a menu of remedies that should apply to each infringement category. Under 
our proposal, the classification of the infringement as inadvertent, standard, 
or willful will determine the monetary and injunctive relief available to 
copyright owners. Naturally, the remedial options in cases of willful 
infringements will be broader than in cases of standard infringements. The 
same principle holds true for the relationship between standard infringements 
and inadvertent infringements. Also, our proposed regime, while harnessing 
the classifications used for statutory damages, places some limitations on the 
availability of statutory damages. Specifically, while seeking to retain the 
availability of statutory damages in order to save the administrative cost of 
proving actual loss, we limit the ability of statutory damages to serve any 
other function (such as serving as punitive damages) in any case other than a 
willful infringement. 
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A. Classifying Infringements  
The first step in our proposal is to distinguish among three prototypes 
of infringements: inadvertent, standard, and willful. 
The first category of “inadvertent infringements” covers all those cases 
in which the infringer was unaware and could not have reasonably become 
aware of the infringing nature of her activity. Infringements falling into this 
category involve no culpability on the infringer’s part and, furthermore, they 
could not have been avoided cost-effectively. Accordingly, the law should 
not seek to deter such infringers. Quite the opposite, the concern that should 
guide lawmakers should be to limit overdeterrence, which may result in the 
dampening of incentives to create. Inadvertent infringers, by our definition, 
are actors who commit copyright infringements in complete good faith while 
displaying respect to the copyright system. They are themselves “victims” of 
the informational uncertainty that engulfs copyright law. Hence, in cases of 
inadvertent infringement, the law should aim to avoid unduly deterring the 
violator. 
The second category of “standard infringements” consists of all 
infringement cases in which the infringer had a reasonable basis to believe 
that her activity may qualify as noninfringing or that she had a good-faith 
defense to liability. This category is designed to address those instances in 
which an actor willingly assumes a calculated risk in deciding to use the 
protected work of another. The user in such cases is aware that if her use is 
challenged in court, it may be ultimately ruled an infringement. Yet, she also 
harbors a reasonable belief that her use should be classified as noninfringing 
or fair. In other words, infringers falling in this category engage in a 
reasonable construction of the copyright doctrine, as applied to the facts of 
their use. If their reasonable construction is accepted by the courts, they 
escape without liability. However, if the judge (or jury) disagrees with them 
and finds them guilty of a copyright infringement, the classification of 
infringement must account for the risk taken by the actor that ultimately did 
not pay off. The reasonableness standard we proffer is similar to the 
reasonableness standard used in the law of torts, in that it encompasses a 
subjective and an objective component. Therefore, it is not enough that the 
infringer reasonably believed that her activity should not be considered 
infringing; she also has to demonstrate that a reasonable person in her 
situation could harbor such a belief. 
Standard infringers, unlike inadvertent infringers, bear a certain degree 
of culpability: after all, by definition, they have taken a calculated risk, 
knowing full well that a court may find them guilty of a copyright 
infringement. Furthermore, they could have secured permission from the 
relevant rightsholder to use the copyrighted content they utilized but elected 
not to do so. Yet, they did not act in willful disregard of the rights of the 
owner of the copyrighted work. Rather, they chose to cope with the 
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uncertainty inherent in copyright law in a reasonable way. What should be 
the legal attitude to such infringers? In light of the danger of overdeterrence 
that inheres in vague legal standards, we think it reasonable to ensure that 
whatever damages are paid for the copyright infringement do not take on a 
punitive character. Recall that the goal of copyright law is to foster expressive 
creativity. If copyright laws were crystal clear, there would be no reasonable 
miscalculations. Alas, this is not the case. The meting out of excessively 
harsh sanctions for standard infringement would likely deter future creativity 
by excessively blocking unlicensed (but arguably lawful) uses of existing 
copyrighted works. 
The third, and final, category of “willful infringements” covers all those 
cases involving blatant disregard of copyright rules. Infringements coming 
under this heading consist of knowing infringements in which the infringer 
had no reasonable basis to believe that she was not infringing or was sheltered 
by a defense. Willful infringements present a very different challenge to 
lawmakers than do inadvertent and standard infringements. It is not only that 
willful infringements display the highest degree of culpability. Just as 
importantly, there is no reason to worry about excessive deterrence of willful 
infringements. The copyright system incentivizes expressive creativity by 
securing to authors exclusive rights in their works for a limited time. The 
period of exclusive rights is intended to incentivize authors by giving them 
an extended opportunity to profit from their works. The statutory mechanism 
depends on the formation of markets for copyrighted works in which authors 
can transact with buyers. Willful infringers bypass the market and thereby 
deprive authors (or copyright owners) of the ability to profit from the 
infringing uses. By so doing, they not only deprive the author of revenues to 
which she is entitled by law but also destabilize the very premise of the 
copyright system by eating away at the authors’ incentives to create.266 
Our proposed categorization of infringements for liability purposes is 
summarized in Table 1 below: 
Table 1 
 
 
266. But see Eduardo Moisés Peñalver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property Outlaws, 155 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1095, 1146–47 (2007) (arguing that blatant and repeated infringement of property rights 
provides a valuable social service by pointing out legal areas in need of change). 
 Inadvertent 
Infringements 
Standard 
Infringements 
Willful 
Infringements 
Definition Unknowing 
infringements in 
which the infringer 
was not aware and 
could not have 
reasonably become 
Infringement 
involving 
reasonable risk-
assumption, where 
putative infringer 
had reasonable basis 
Infringements 
involving blatant 
disregard of 
copyright rules, 
intentional 
infringement and 
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B. Tailoring Remedies to the Class of Infringement 
The second step in our scheme is to match a remedial menu to each 
infringement category. This is the more radical component of our proposal. 
Yet, it is a necessary complement to the categorization we proposed above.267 
1. Inadvertent Infringements.—The remedial menu for inadvertent 
infringement will consist almost exclusively of compensatory damages for 
actual losses suffered by copyright owners. Under our proposal, successful 
plaintiffs in inadvertent infringement cases would not be able to receive 
statutory damages or recover the inadvertent infringer’s profits. Nor would 
they be able to impound infringing copies or the equipment used to produce 
them. In very rare cases, however, we would allow the monetary relief to be 
supplemented by injunctive relief. 
As we explained, the main policy goal in cases of inadvertent 
infringement is to avoid overdeterrence. Hence, it is critical to tailor the 
remedial menu such that it would afford copyright owners an opportunity to 
collect full compensation for the losses they suffered as a result of the 
infringement, without possibility for windfalls. For this reason, we leave 
open the possibility of standard compensatory damages but take the options 
of statutory damages that do not depend on proof of harm and even recovery 
of profits off the table. In our view, cases like Harrisongs and Williams would 
have been decided differently as far as the remedial aspect is concerned. Both 
The Chiffons (or more accurately, their record label) and the Gaye Estate 
would have had to suffice with compensation for the actual loss they suffered. 
Neither Harrison nor Thicke and Pharrell would have been required to 
forsake their profits. 
The only other remedy copyright owners would be able to obtain against 
inadvertent infringers would be injunctive relief, but only in rare cases. In 
order to avoid abuse of injunctive relief, we would divide inadvertent 
infringements between two kinds of cases. Where the inadvertent 
infringement consists of using the protected work in a manner that does not 
involve any further creative work—for instance, the distribution of a book 
 
267. See supra subpart III(A). 
aware of the 
infringing nature of 
her activity. 
to believe that her 
activity may qualify 
as non-infringing or 
that she has a good 
faith defense to 
liability. 
cases in which 
putative infringer 
had no reasonable 
basis to believe that 
she was not 
infringing or that 
she was sheltered 
by a defense. 
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that turns out still to be under copyright protection—injunctions should be 
readily obtained. Courts should be able to block further distributions of the 
copyrighted work since no new content is implicated. By contrast, where the 
infringement is incorporated into a new work, injunctions should never be 
granted. Importantly, this new work need not reach the level of a derivative 
work, such as the incorporation of a protected book into the screenplay of a 
new film. Rather, any new content should be enough to block an injunction. 
Given the fact that the user will have to prove that the use of the copyrighted 
work was inadvertent, it will be difficult to add new content strategically 
simply in order to avoid injunctions. 
2. Standard Infringements.—The category of standard infringements 
calls for a more expansive remedial menu. As we explained, in this case, 
overdeterrence is still a concern, but it is a weaker concern relative to the case 
of inadvertent infringements. Recall that standard infringers, by our 
definition, made a calculated decision to open themselves up to a liability 
finding. As we made clear, allowing this choice to serve as a bar to recovery 
would eviscerate copyright protection. And it must be borne in mind that the 
calculated decision made by standard infringers imposes a cost on copyright 
owners, who played no part in the decision. In light of this fact, copyright 
owners who prevail in an infringement suit against a standard infringement 
should be able to take advantage of a richer remedial menu. At the same time, 
standard infringements still place a heavy burden on users, requiring them to 
know information that may be uniquely at the disposal of owners, or 
requiring them to take excessive precautionary steps to avoid overstepping 
legal bounds. Thus, the remedies should not reflect the full extent of the 
copyright remedy’s punitive potential. 
Concretely, we propose that successful plaintiffs in copyright 
infringements should be entitled to seek compensatory damages for their 
actual losses and restitution for lost profits. As far as restitution of profits is 
concerned, courts should not rush to award successful plaintiffs the full 
amount of the infringer’s profits, and should try to fashion, instead, fair 
profit-sharing arrangements that would reflect the respective contributions of 
the parties and maintain their mutual interest in the successful distribution of 
the infringing work in those cases where the infringing work contains original 
authorship. 
Our scheme would also allow successful plaintiffs in standard 
infringement cases to substitute statutory damages for actual damages. 
However, statutory-damages awards in standard infringement cases would be 
available only for compensatory and not punitive purposes. Thus, defendants 
against whom statutory damages are sought would be entitled to prove that 
statutory damages exceeded actual losses suffered by the rightsholder and 
reduce the statutory damages accordingly. 
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Finally, our proposal would allow for the grant of injunctive relief to 
successful plaintiffs in standard infringement cases. The reason injunctive 
relief should be granted in some cases is that ongoing infringements can 
cause great harm to the financial interest of copyright owners, and ex post 
compensation cannot adequately address it. To illustrate this risk, assume that 
a user erroneously believes she has a license from the copyright owner to 
distribute her work on the Internet for free. To make the matter more 
concrete, assume that the work at issue is the next season of Game of Thrones. 
On these facts, the grant of injunctive relief to the copyright owner is 
warranted. The continuous, unauthorized distribution of the series causes 
great harm to the copyright owner and compensation after the fact may not 
be a viable option. Hence, courts ought to have the option of awarding 
injunctive relief in appropriate cases but must be circumspect in their use of 
this option. 
However, we argue that injunctive relief should be used sparsely and 
not be granted as a matter of course by courts. Rather, as in the case of 
inadvertent infringements, courts should reserve injunctions to those cases in 
which monetary damages do not adequately compensate the plaintiff. It is 
important not to use injunctive relief excessively since its use not only affects 
the defendant but also deprives the public of the ability to use the disputed 
work. 
3. Willful Infringements.—As for the third category, that of willful 
infringements, here, overdeterrence is not a paramount concern, at least not 
one that should lead to the removal of any of the remedial options that are 
currently available under the Copyright Act. It should be remembered that 
willful infringers not only harm the incentive to create of the individual 
authors whose work they copy but also threaten to undermine, via their 
behavior, the very foundation of the copyright system. In the case of willful 
infringers, therefore, rightsholders should be entitled to the full panoply of 
civil remedies available under the Copyright Act, as well as criminal 
sanctions. 
Specifically, in cases of willful infringements, courts should have the 
discretion to award compensatory damages, restitution of lost profits, high 
awards of statutory damages, as well as to grant successful plaintiffs 
injunctive relief and impoundment orders. By our lights, criminal sanctions 
are also appropriate in this case. This is not to say that willful infringers 
should bear the full brunt of the law in each and every case. The particular 
relief granted in individual cases ought to be tailored to the particular 
circumstances of the case, including the actual loss of the copyright holder, 
the profit of the infringer, and the level of culpability of the defendant. Yet, 
in fashioning the remedial options for the category of willful infringements, 
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we see no reason to scale back the list that exists today by removing certain 
categories of remedies. 
Our proposed remedial menus are summarized in Table 2, following: 
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Table 2 
 
 Inadvertent 
Infringements 
Standard 
Infringements 
Willful 
Infringements 
Remedies Only: 
- Compensatory 
damages for actual 
losses 
- Injunctions in rare 
cases (no follow-on 
work) 
- Compensatory 
damages for actual 
losses 
- Restitution for 
profits 
- Rebuttable/low 
statutory damages 
- Injunctions in rare 
cases 
- Compensatory 
damages for actual 
losses 
- Restitution for 
profits 
- Irrebuttable/High 
statutory damages 
- Injunctions 
- Impoundment 
orders 
- Criminal sanctions 
IV. Comparing Reforms 
A. Administrative Costs of Reform 
To this point, our discussion has featured two central elements. First, we 
have analyzed the vast array of types of infringement.268 Second, we have 
divided these many infringements into three categories based on the degree 
of culpability of the infringer,269 and we have proposed a remedial menu 
tailored to each of the proposed categories.270 
At this point a question should naturally present itself: If there are so 
many different kinds of infringement, why do we limit our proposed reform 
in remedies to merely three new categories? Why not five, or a dozen? Or for 
that matter, why not have infinitely tailorable remedies, depending on the 
type and degree of culpability, as judges or juries may find them in any given 
case? 
To answer this question, it is important to return to the premises of our 
analysis. Our analysis is frankly and openly pragmatic. While we recognize 
that liability schemes based on culpability are intuitively appealing for 
reasons of fairness, we do not presume that there is an ontological “wrong” 
to using rights that copyright law assigns to another. We do not suppose that 
we have the tools to measure the precise degree of moral wrong (if any) 
committed by scanning and reprinting without permission a pamphlet first 
published by a since-deceased author in 1980 and the difference in moral 
culpability of the same action if the pamphlet were first published by a since-
deceased author in 1930. Our focus on culpability is not tied to a broader 
 
268. See supra subpart I(B). 
269. See supra subpart II(B). 
270. See supra subpart III(B). 
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claim about the moral rightness or wrongness of any particular violation of 
the legal rules of copyright. 
Rather, our focus on blameworthiness and remedies as the two key 
variables of our proposed reform stems from practical reasons. Specifically, 
by focusing on these two elements, our scheme provides a ready means to 
reduce overdeterrence and to incentivize the provision of further information 
without incurring excessive administrative, litigation, and other transaction 
costs. Our proposal can be readily implemented without the need for new 
legislation and without radically transforming the evidentiary or judicial 
burdens already produced by copyright-infringement cases. 
The reason for our confidence that our proposal can be implemented 
easily is the importance of the blameworthiness of the alleged infringer to 
copyright litigation as it stands today. While culpability is not a part of the 
ordinary infringement claim, plaintiffs in copyright cases routinely seek 
statutory damages; indeed, in 89% of cases the plaintiff requests statutory 
damages.271 Since the law dictates that statutory damages be keyed to 
culpability, in the overwhelming majority of copyright cases, plaintiffs must 
already bring evidence of the defendants’ culpability; defendants seeking to 
reduce statutory damages must bring their own evidence; and the courts—
judges and juries alike—must already pay careful attention to questions of 
blameworthiness.272 Courts, in other words, are no stranger to determinations 
about culpability; on the contrary, they are well versed in making them. This 
is not to say that courts always analyze and decide blameworthiness correctly. 
Professor Pamela Samuelson has pilloried the inconsistencies in courts’ 
statutory-damages rulings.273 We do not dispute her findings. Whenever the 
law divides liability into categories, it runs the risk of errant classifications. 
Laws nevertheless often eschew uniform liability in favor of categorizations 
in order to calibrate deterrence and other aims of the law. We suggest no 
more. 
The second prong of our proposal—to attach a predetermined remedial 
menu to each form of infringement—can also be readily effected. We do not 
call on courts to adopt new remedial forms. All we ask them to do is to limit 
the remedies awarded to successful plaintiffs in cases of inadvertent and 
standard infringements—willful infringers will continue to bear the full brunt 
of all the remedies available under the Copyright Act, as they do today.274 As 
we explained, this aspect of our proposal is appealing not only for practical 
reasons but also for normative ones. The remedies that copyright owners can 
receive determine not only the extent of their compensation but also the level 
 
271. Depoorter, supra note 47, at 419. 
272. Id. at 410–11. 
273. Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 23, at 485 & n.238. 
274. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2012). 
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of deterrence experienced by users, who often cannot ascertain their use 
privileges with respect to copyrighted content.275 Capping the potential risk 
of liability to which users are exposed is likely to increase the use of 
expressive content and ameliorate the problem of overdeterrence. 
Our adoption of three classifications of culpability and our assignment 
of the question to the remedy stage thus closely matches existing patterns of 
litigation. Thanks to the extant structure of statutory damages, courts and 
litigants are already accustomed to arguing for the assignment of culpability 
to one of three categories and to making culpability arguments and 
determinations. Against the baseline of extant law, our proposal is a low-cost 
way of introducing greater calibration of liability and thereby better tailored 
deterrence against copyright infringement. 
B. Alternative Reforms 
To be sure, copyright law must be aimed at more than merely reducing 
the costs of administering the law. Our proposal is a rough attempt at 
calibrating deterrence and incentivizing the production of information 
without significantly raising the costs of administering copyright law. It is 
not the only possible balance, and we do not claim any empirical proof that 
ours is the optimal balance. We do not claim to have found the data that 
permit us to choose, from the vast universe of alternative possibilities, the 
right balance for calibrating incentives without increased administrative costs 
swallowing the gains. Thus, in the remainder of this part, we discuss potential 
lines of research that might shed some light on the optimal balance of 
deterrence, administrative costs, and incentivizing production of information. 
We do not claim that our discussion exhausts the full range of reform 
possibilities. Our aim, rather, is to chart paths for future research. 
1. More Categories.—A natural extension of our scheme is to create 
additional categories of liability. The number of categories need not be 
limited to three. The more categories one adds, the more justice will be done 
to the complexity that has become the hallmark of the digital copyright era. 
For example, our category of standard defendants can be divided into the 
well-known categories from the law of torts—namely negligent, grossly 
negligent, and reckless defendants.276 This would create a legal field of five 
categories of infringement. One need not stop there, of course. It is possible, 
 
275. See Lieb v. Topstone Indus., Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 156 (3d Cir. 1986) (“Factors which should 
play a part [regarding copyright-infringement remedies] include . . . the need in particular 
circumstances to advance considerations of compensation and deterrence.”); Samuelson & 
Wheatland, supra note 23, at 445 (“The application of statutory damages . . . has focused too heavily 
on deterrence and punishment by holding many ordinary infringements to be willful, which has 
resulted in many awards that are punitive in effect and often in intent.”). 
276. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
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as a thought experiment, to conceptualize a regime of copyright liability that 
takes the form of a continuum, rather than discrete categories. The continuum 
of moral blameworthiness of defendants (or righteousness of copyright 
owners) would be examined by the judges (or jury) who would then base 
their remedial determinations on the precise degree of culpability of the 
defendant. 
The obvious downside of creating many categories of liability, let alone 
of creating a continuum model, comes in the form of lengthier and more 
costly adjudicative decision-making, as well as associated error costs and 
litigation costs.277 The more fine-grained a liability system one adopts, the 
more difficult it will become to draw the lines between categories with a real 
degree of precision. Furthermore, such a system would induce parties to 
expend resources on convincing courts to put them in a more lenient category 
if they are defendants and a harsher category if they are plaintiffs. Hence, the 
number of categories cannot be infinite. Grading has its costs and at some 
point they will outweigh the benefits. This is not to say, of course, that the 
optimal number of categories is three, as it is under our proposal. The virtue 
of our proposal is that it tracks the same categories that already exist under 
the Copyright Act in the context of statutory damages, and thus it minimizes 
transition costs. The adoption of our proposal, in other words, would not 
require judges to educate themselves or adopt a new set of skills. But we 
cannot a fortiori rule out the possibility that the long-term benefits of a more 
finely grained liability scheme that includes more liability categories would 
not outweigh the aggregate costs associated with adopting it. 
2. Per Se Liability.—A different way of reforming copyright liability 
draws its inspiration from antitrust law. Readers familiar with antitrust 
jurisprudence know that antitrust violations are divided into two general 
categories: per se violations and rule of reason violations.278 An example of 
a per se violation is horizontal price fixing.279 An example of a rule of reason 
 
277. See Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Categorical Analysis in Antitrust 
Jurisprudence, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1207, 1259–63 (2008) (discussing the costs of courts’ categorical 
analysis in antitrust cases and mentioning, inter alia, error costs, determination costs, and litigation 
costs); see also PETER M. GERHART, PROPERTY LAW AND SOCIAL MORALITY 42–44 (2014) 
(discussing categorization costs on the ground of an information-costs analysis). 
278. See Lemley & Leslie, supra note 277, at 1213 (discussing the modes of antitrust analysis); 
Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling the Per Se and Rule of Reason Approaches to Antitrust Analysis, 
64 S. CAL. L. REV. 685, 685 (1991) (discussing the per se and rule of reason approaches); Richard 
M. Steuer, Indiana Federation of Dentists: The Per Se–Rule of Reason Continuum (and a Comment 
on State Action), 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 1101, 1101 (1987) (“[T]he Supreme Court labored at defining 
two categories of antitrust offenses—those that were illegal per se and those that violated the ‘rule 
of reason.’”). 
279. Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market 
Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 391 (1966) (“[A]ll horizontal price fixing and market division is illegal 
per se . . . .”). 
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violation is the adoption of a resale price by a provider.280 The distinction 
between per se violations and rule of reason violations tracks the distinction 
between rules and standards. Per se violations are an example of a legal rule 
in that they provide clear and advance definitions of activities that are 
categorically illegal. Rule of reason violations represent legal standards, as 
they require post hoc analysis of the precise effect of commercial activities.281 
As Chris Sprigman has suggested, it is possible to introduce a similar 
distinction into copyright law.282 For instance, one could argue that all cases 
of literal copying, bodily appropriations of copyrighted content, should be 
made per se illegal, while pattern copying, nonbodily appropriations 
consisting of the taking of concept and feel of another work, should be subject 
to a rule of reason. The central advantages of adopting such a system are 
certainty and judicial cost savings. Placing literal copying under the category 
of per se infringement would result in a simpler liability system than that 
which we have today, as literal copiers will be barred from raising defenses. 
This, in turn, would also economize on judicial resources. The problem with 
this proposal is that it may lead to inequitable and inefficient results in certain 
cases. Literal copying may serve important social causes. It may improve 
public welfare by making important content available to the public, it is 
essential to the creation of parodies, and as Jeanne Fromer and Amy Adler 
recently established, it may represent a form of self-help for artists whose 
works have been appropriated by others.283 
A variant of the proposed regime will not make any act of literal copying 
per se illegal, but only literal copying of 100%; i.e., full bodily appropriations 
of content. The introduction of a quantitative modifier, the requirement for a 
100% taking, would narrow down the per se category. The modified version 
has a lot more surface appeal, as it seems to sit well with prevailing moral 
intuitions. It is also consistent with current law.284 However, it is not without 
 
280. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 908 (2007) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Today the Court holds that courts must determine the lawfulness of 
minimum resale price maintenance by applying, not a bright-line per se rule, but a circumstance-
specific ‘rule of reason.’”). By ruling so, the court had overruled the Dr. Miles rule that remained 
in force for 96 years. Id. 
281. Piraino, supra note 278, at 685 (“Thus, pro-competitive conduct should receive the benefit 
of the doubt under a rule of reason that considers all of its possible justifications and beneficial 
effects. Anticompetitive practices, on the other hand, should be summarily condemned under the 
per se rule . . . .”). 
282. Christopher Sprigman, Copyright and the Rule of Reason, 7 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH 
TECH. L. 317, 325 (2009) (“[T]he introduction of a per se/rule of reason distinction into copyright 
law would incentivize the production of more information about the incentive effects of a variety of 
uses of copyrighted works.”). 
283. Amy Adler & Jeanne C. Fromer, Taking Intellectual Property into Their Own Hands, 107 
CALIF. L. REV. 1455, 1505–06 (2019). 
284. One can argue that to a large degree this is the law today: bodily appropriators of a 
considerable percentage of a copyrighted work would find it very difficult to argue fair use 
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its problems. First, in the case of some works—such as photos, poems, 
tattoos, graffiti, short slogans—copying of the entire work is a common 
practice and it is often difficult to take less without distorting the content, 
message, or meaning of the original work.285 In other instances where it is 
possible to take less than 100% of the work, copyists who would quickly 
become aware of the new legal regime would suffice themselves with 
appropriation of less than the full work in order to avoid the application of 
the per se rule. Finally, the proposed per se rule ignores the potential social 
utility of full body appropriations of expressive content. As we have 
established elsewhere, such appropriations may be justified not only in 
instances of parodies but also in instances in which the defendant would like 
to use the plaintiff’s work or statement as proof that she actually made it, as 
is the case between two political rivals or two academics.286 
3. New Defenses.—Another way in which copyright liability might be 
varied is along the dimension of defenses. Instead of adopting our proposal, 
lawmakers could keep in place a uniform system of liability but recognize 
new types of defenses. As we have noted earlier in this Article, historically 
U.S. copyright law recognized an innocent infringer defense.287 
Reintroducing an innocent infringer defense could be the functional 
equivalent of adopting a category of inadvertent infringements. Furthermore, 
it is possible to give weight to the culpability of the defendant as part of the 
fair use defense. In assessing fair use claims, courts primarily rely on the four 
statutory factors listed in § 107 of the Copyright Act, namely: (1) the purpose 
and nature of the use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount 
and substantiality taken; and (4) the actual and potential effect on the market 
for the copyrighted work.288 Fair use, in other words, is a multifactored 
defense that leaves a lot of discretion to the court. Importantly, the 
enumeration of factors in § 107 is not a closed one and courts have the 
 
successfully. See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1132 
(1990) (“[T]he fair use test is difficult to predict. It depends on widely varying perceptions held by 
different judges.”). 
285. See Justin Hughes, Size Matters (Or Should) in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 575, 
636 (2005) (“When liability for copyright infringement boils down to copying a name, a couple of 
choice phrases, a slogan, or a small subset of numeric evaluations, copyright law is being dragged 
by clever lawyers into dark alleys where it should not go.”); Leval, supra note 284, at 1123–24 
(discussing short literary work); Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 
93 VA. L. REV. 1483, 1517 (2007) (discussing visual works). 
286. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Dual-Grant Theory of Fair Use, 83 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1051, 1085 (2016) (describing political speech and truth seeking as “privileged 
categories” in a copyright-infringement analysis). 
287. Reese, supra note 226, at 180–81. 
288. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
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authority to consider additional factors.289 Courts, therefore, have the 
authority to consider the culpability of users who raise the fair use defense, 
and, in fact, have already exercised this power. In Harper & Row, Publishers, 
Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,290 for instance, the Supreme Court denied the 
defendant’s fair use claim, inter alia, because it acted in bad faith.291 The case 
was brought after the Nation magazine had copied several short passages 
from a purloined copy of President Ford’s memoirs prior to the book’s 
publication.292 Writing for the majority, Justice O’Connor ruled that the 
defendant, the Nation magazine, was fully aware that it was in possession of 
a stolen manuscript that was about to be published and, by deciding to use it, 
acted in bad faith.293 This played a role—perhaps decisive—in the decision 
that the Nation could not avail itself of a fair use defense.294 
Here, too, one should tread with caution in incorporating culpability into 
fair use doctrine. Presently, the key variable in fair use cases is 
transformativeness.295 The more transformative a defendant’s use, the more 
likely it is to be considered fair. Transformative uses have been recognized 
as fair uses even in cases of bad faith copying. The most extreme examples 
to date are found in the cases of appropriation art. As noted above, courts 
have in no small number of cases sided with the bad faith appropriator.296 
Defenders of appropriation art claim that transformative works may be of 
considerable social value irrespective of the moral posture of their creators.297 
As Pablo Picasso famously quipped, “good artists copy, great artists steal.”298 
Hence, before rushing to transform the fair use defense, lawmakers should 
carefully assess the implications of keying fair use determinations to moral 
notions. 
4. Contributory Fault.—Finally, it is also possible to vary copyright 
liability based on the degree of fault or negligence of the copyright owner. 
Like contemporary copyright liability, tort liability was once binary. 
 
289. More Information on Fair Use, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., https://www.copyright.gov/fair-use
/more-info.html [https://perma.cc/8T9J-ML59] (last updated Sept. 2019) (“[O]ther factors may also 
be considered by a court in weighing a fair use question, depending upon the circumstances.”). 
290. 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
291. Id. at 542, 563. 
292. Id. at 542. 
293. Id. at 562–63. 
294. Id. 
295. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (“[T]he more 
transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors . . . .”). 
296. Leval, supra note 284, at 1126–27. 
297. Id. at 1126 (“The inquiry should focus not on the morality of the secondary user, but on 
whether . . . the secondary use is productive and transformative . . . .”). 
298. John Mullins & Randy Komisar, A Business Plan? Or a Journey to Plan B?, MIT SLOAN 
MGMT. REV., Spring 2010, at 1, 2. 
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Historically, defendants in tort cases were either liable for the full harm 
occasioned by their actions or omissions on their victims or not liable at all.299 
Modern tort law follows a radically different design. Today, tort law 
incorporates the notion of comparative fault, which allows courts to 
apportion responsibility for harms between tortfeasors and victims.300 It is 
possible to adopt a similar design for copyright liability. For example, we 
could amend copyright law to provide that authors and publishers who did 
not affix a copyright notice to their works would not be able to sue others or 
would only be able to collect certain minimal damages. In fact, the Copyright 
Act adumbrates this possibility by affording statutory damages only to 
copyright owners who registered their work prior to the infringement for 
which they sue.301 To be sure, such a reform would necessitate the 
reintroduction or augmentation of certain formalities that the copyright 
system abolished some forty years ago. But Chris Sprigman, as well as other 
academics, have presented a powerful prima facie case for effecting this 
change.302 Copyright owners who have not taken reasonable measures to 
notify users that content is protected should be deemed partially responsible 
for infringements of their rights, and while they should not be denied legal 
relief altogether, the remedies awarded to them should be adjusted downward 
to reflect this fact. 
In a similar vein, Congress can reform the Copyright Act to deny 
recourse to copyright owners who induced users to infringe their work. There 
exists a myriad of examples of copyright owners who uploaded content onto 
various Internet sites, enticed users to use the content, and then sued them.303 
The doctrine of copyright misuse can potentially address such cases.304 
 
299. See Arthur Best, Impediments to Reasonable Tort Reform: Lessons from the Adoption of 
Comparative Negligence, 40 IND. L. REV. 1, 2 (2007) (“[Contributory negligence] completely 
precluded a plaintiff’s recovery in any case where the plaintiff and defendant were both negligent.”). 
300. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of Cal., 532 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Cal. 1975) (“The doctrine of 
comparative negligence is preferable to the ‘all-or-nothing’ doctrine of contributory negligence 
from the point of view of logic, practical experience, and fundamental justice . . . .”). 
301. 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2012). 
302. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson & Members of the CPP, The Copyright Principles Project: 
Directions for Reform, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1175, 1194–95 (2010) (“[P]rinciples of primary 
and secondary liability should continue to play a role in encouraging technology and service 
providers to participate in deploying reasonable measures and discouraging widespread 
infringement.”); Sprigman, supra note 282, at 336–37. 
303. A recent example is a case in which two attorneys threatened to sue thousands of people 
who downloaded pornographic films without permission in order to profit from settlements. The 
lawyers filmed some of these movies and uploaded them to file-sharing websites with the intention 
of enticing the alleged violators. See Plea Agreement and Sentencing Stipulations at 2, United States 
v. Steele, No. 16-334 (JNE/KMM) (D. Minn. Mar. 6, 2017). 
304. See Brad A. Greenberg, Copyright Trolls and the Common Law, 100 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 
77, 86 (2015) (suggesting a judicial application of the misuse doctrine on copyright-trolling cases). 
More generally on the evolution of the copyright misuse doctrine, see Kathryn Judge, Rethinking 
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However, misuse doctrine is confused and, perhaps because the 
consequences of misuse are extreme, courts shy away from it and rarely find 
misuse.305 In this instance, therefore, improving the law requires cooperation 
not only from the legislature but also from the courts. 
Conclusion 
In this Article, we proposed a new liability regime for copyright 
infringements predicated on the degree of blameworthiness of the infringer. 
Concretely, we called for the establishment of three distinct liability 
categories—inadvertent, standard, and willful infringements—and proposed 
a specific menu of remedies for each of the categories. Under our proposal, 
inadvertent infringements would be remedied by compensatory damages 
only. Standard infringements would entitle copyright owners to a broader 
variety of monetary damages that includes restitution and profits, and in the 
alternative, limited statutory damages, but typically no injunctive relief. 
Willful infringements would be addressed by the full panoply of remedies 
available under the Copyright Act, including potentially punitive statutory 
damages and injunctions. 
Our proposal marks a significant departure from the current regime that 
ignores the culpability level of infringements and treats all infringements 
alike for liability purposes. As we demonstrated, the existing “one-size-fits-
all” design of copyright liability sets back the goals of the Copyright Act, as 
it causes overdeterrence and discourages future creativity. Furthermore, it 
fails to incentivize copyright owners to fully disclose proprietary and 
transactional information about their works. The result is both unfair and 
inefficient. Extant law metes out excessive penalties on users and creators 
who are ill-situated to handle the cloud of uncertainty that shrouds our 
copyright system, even though such users and creators often act in good faith. 
It likewise fails to distinguish between creators and users who try to navigate 
the uncertainties of copyright law, even if they ultimately fail, and blatant 
infringers who do not bother to partake of this quest. Most importantly, extant 
law discourages socially desirable uses of copyrighted works by creating an 
excessive fear of the penalties of copyright infringements. Our proposal of 
graduated liability yields a far more nuanced and just liability system, one 
that would also enhance use of existing works and future creativity. 
 
Copyright Misuse, 57 STAN. L. REV. 901, 905–12 (2004) and David S. Olson, First Amendment 
Based Copyright Misuse, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 537, 570–83 (2010). 
305. See Jason Mazzone, Copyfraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1026, 1090 (2006) (“This limit on the 
defendant’s ability to assert the misuse defense will permit much copyfraud to survive. . . . [C]ourts 
should consider loosening the nexus requirement.”). 
